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I. INTRODUCTION
The Hawai'i experience in terms of judicial takings is of
national significance. The concept of a judicial taking-namely,
where a state supreme court by retroactively overruling prior
precedent allegedly "takes" vested rights in violation of the United
States Constitution-was first held to be a valid claim by a federal
district court in Hawai'i.1
Throughout the United States, there are only three federal
decisions affirming the concept of a judicial taking.2 All three arise
* Professor of Law, University of Hawai'i William S. Richardson School of
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author, Williamson B.C. Chang, The Life of the Law Is Perpetuated in
Righteousness: The Jurisprudence of William S. Richardson, 33 U. HAW. L.
REv. 99 (2010). The Widener Law Journal would like to thank the publisher of
this prior work, the University of Hawai'i Law Review, for its cooperation in
allowing the Journal to republish and cite to these portions.]
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559, 585-86 (D. Haw. 1977), affd in
part, vacated in part, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 902
(1986).
2 See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1474 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated,
477 U.S. 902 (1986); Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473, 481-82
(D. Haw. 1978); Robinson, 441 F. Supp. at 585-86. These are the only lower
federal court opinions that have found a judicial taking to exist. The decisions in
Robinson v. Ariyoshi were vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Ariyoshi v. Robinson, 477 U.S. 902, 902 (1986). The decision in
Sotomura was appealed to the Ninth Circuit. See Sotomura v. County of Hawaii,
679 F.2d 152, 152 (9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision, but
not on the merits, ruling that the late filing of the State's brief undermined the
State's position on appeal. Id.
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from disputes originating in Hawai'i.3 The most important of these
disputes was the water rights dispute in McBryde Sugar Co. v.
Robinson,4 later to be known as Robinson v. Ariyoshi.s
Today, in light of the ruling by four justices in Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental
Protection6 that such a claim as a judicial taking does exist,7
judicial takings have become a hot topic. There are more than 100
law review articles addressing some aspect of judicial takings.9
3 See Robinson, 753 F.2d at 1469; Sotomura, 460 F. Supp. at 474;
Robinson, 441 F. Supp. at 561.
4 See generally McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330 (Haw.
1973) (deciding water rights dispute between parties who owned land in
Hawai'i), affd on reh'g, 517 P.2d 26 (Haw. 1973) (per curium).
See generally Robinson, 441 F. Supp. at 561-65 (showing the
development of the underlying dispute that involved the McBryde decision).
6 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592 (2010).
7 Id. at 2601-02 (plurality opinion).
This author has written several articles that deal with the issue of judicial
takings, at least in part, and related matters. See generally Williamson B.C.
Chang, Missing the Boat: The Ninth Circuit, Hawaiian Water Rights and the
Constitutionality of Retroactive Overruling, 16 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 123
(1986) [hereinafter Chang, Missing the Boat]; Williamson B.C. Chang,
Rediscovering the Rooker Doctrine: Section 1983, Res Judicata and the Federal
Courts, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1337 (1980) [hereinafter Chang, Rediscovering
Rooker]; Williamson B.C. Chang, Unraveling Robinson v. Ariyoshi: Can
Courts "Take Property?", 2 U. HAW. L. REv. 57 (1979) [hereinafter Chang,
Unraveling Robinson]; Williamson B.C. Chang, Zen, Law and Language: Of
Power and Paradigms, 16 N.M. L. REv. 543 (1986) [hereinafter Chang, Zen].
9 See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45
U. RiCH. L. REv. 903 (2011) (making several arguments regarding judicial
takings in light of the Stop the Beach Renourishment decision); Elizabeth B.
Wydra, Constitutional Problems with Judicial Takings Doctrine and the
Supreme Court's Decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment, 29 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 109 (2011) (addressing constitutional issues implicated by
the concept of judicial takings).
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Still, the number of federal judicial opinions finding a judicial
taking remains at three. 10 There are only those three opinions from
Hawai'i. Thus, it is important to examine the most important of
these cases in detail. What exactly happened in Robinson v.
Ariyoshi?
The federal district court and the court of appeals held that the
Supreme Court of Hawai'i decision in McBryde Sugar Co. v.
Robinson was a taking." The Supreme Court of the United States
vacated those two federal opinions.12 Many commentators view
Robinson v. Ariyoshi as the prima facie case of a judicial taking.13
Was Robinson v. Ariyoshi a judicial taking?
10 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
" See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1474 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated,
477 U.S. 902 (1986); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559, 585-86 (D. Haw.
1977), affd in part, vacated in part, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477
U.S. 902 (1986).
12 Ariyoshi v. Robinson, 477 U.S. 902, 902 (1986).
13 The dispute has been cited, in its various forms, in over sixty cases and
more than sixty law review articles, including a majority of judicial takings
scholarship. See, e.g., Barros, supra note 9, at 941 (calling the Robinson
decision a good example of a "deprivation of a property interest without
procedural due process"); David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of
Custom: Beach Access and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1375, 1438
(1996) (calling Robinson the "best known" decision where "federal courts have
overturned state court judgments that, via a retroactive change in the state
common law of property, resulted in property rights being transferred to the
states"); J. Nicholas Bunch, Takings, Judicial Takings, and Patent Law, 83 TEX.
L. REv. 1747, 1796 (2005) (reflecting Robinson-related scholarship arguing
against a judicial takings doctrine as the "weight of the academic literature");
James H. Davenport & Craig Bell, Governmental Interference with the Use of
Water: When Do Unconstitutional "Takings" Occur?, 9 U. DENV. WATER L.
REv. 1, 25-26 (2005) (citing Robinson for the proposition that a "judiciary's
action amending state property law pertaining to water rights may, however,
have the effect of taking the property without compensation"); John Martinez,
Taking Time Seriously: The Federal Constitutional Right to Be Free from
"Startling" State Court Overrulings, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 297, 341
(1988) (using Robinson as a case study for a proposed approach to takings law);
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This article seeks to determine whether, in light of the
plurality's definition of a judicial taking in Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Robinson would be a judicial taking.
Moreover, what can we learn today from the tumultuous
litigation in Robinson v. Ariyoshi? For example, are judicial
takings claims as disruptive of state-federal court relations as some
commentators think? Should state supreme courts that allegedly
take property be given a second chance to explain their actions?
Should the Supreme Court of the United States always certify or
remand to state supreme courts to garner those courts' views of the
taking transgressions they have allegedly committed?
Thus, this article proceeds in three parts. First, it presents the
history, the inside details, of Robinson v. Ariyoshi. Second, this
article examines how Robinson would fare under the present
plurality's test for a judicial taking. Finally, in the conclusion, this
article presents what can be learned from the litigation in Robinson
v. Ariyoshi.
The history of Robinson v. Ariyoshi cannot be told without
reference to former chief justice of the Supreme Court of Hawai'i,
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REv. 1449, 1471 (1990)
(citing Robinson as one of two federal court decisions holding state supreme
court decisions to be unconstitutional takings and stating that "[the court]
radically chang[ed] the face of Hawaiian water law"); Roderick E. Walston, The
Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings, and Judicial
Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379, 424 (2001) (using Robinson as an example of
a case that "directly raised" the takings question and was presented to the
Supreme Court); Ian Fein, Note, Why Judicial Takings Are Unripe, 38 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 749, 770 (2011) (citing Robinson as "the only federal appellate court
opinion that ever recognized a judicial taking"); Mitch L. Walter, Comment,
From Background Principles to Bright Lines: Justice Scalia and the
Conservative Bloc of the U.S. Supreme Court Attempt to Change the Law of
Property As We Know It [Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida
Department of Environmental Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010)], 50
WASHBURN L.J. 799, 810 (2011) (noting that Robinson is one of two examples
of when a federal court ruled a state supreme court decision "took" property).
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William S. Richardson.14 It was the across-the-board efforts of
Chief Justice Richardson to correct Hawai'i's property law' 5 that
led to the slew of takings claims that were filed in Hawai'i.16
Robinson v. Ariyoshi was the most important of these attacks on
his jurisprudence.
The Chief Justice was not only the author for the court in
those decisions of the Supreme Court of Hawai'i that allegedly
took property.17 He also appeared, through counsel, in the takings
- * 18litigation as amicus curiae.
Thus, the chief justice was not only the main protagonist in the
takings claim-he was, in a formal judicial sense, an advocate
against the application of the judicial takings concept in the very
litigation brought against his own court. An understanding of
14 For a complete account of Chief Justice Richardson's impact on the
Robinson case and his influence on Hawaiian property law, see generally
Williamson B.C. Chang, The Life of the Law Is Perpetuated in Righteousness:
The Jurisprudence of William S. Richardson, 33 U. HAW. L. REv. 99 (2010)
[hereinafter Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness].
15 See generally Hawaii v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725, 739 (Haw. 1977)
(holding that new land created by lava extension belonged to the state); In re
Sanbom, 562 P.2d 771, 774-75 (Haw. 1977) (determining that landowner's
"beachfront title boundary is the upper reaches of the wash of waves" as
represented by the "vegetation and debris line"); In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 77
(Haw. 1968) (holding "that 'ma ke kai' is along the upper reaches of the waves,
usually evidenced by the edge of vegetation or by the line of debris left by the
wash of waves").
16 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteouness, supra note 14, at 124.
17 Compare Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 292 (Haw. 1982)
(showing that Chief Justice Richardson was the authoring justice of the majority
opinion in this decision that allegedly took property), with Chang, Perpetuated
in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 128-29, 132 n.141 (explaining that "the
Honorable William S. Richardson appeared as amicus curiae in the Ninth Circuit
proceedings" regarding the Robinson case).
18 The author of this article was counsel for Chief Justice Richardson, who
appeared as amicus curiae in the Robinson litigation on behalf of the Hawai'i




Robinson v. Ariyoshi thus depends on an examination of the chief
justice's views as expressed in his opinions and in the briefs filed
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.19
Chief Justice Richardson was a humble man from humble
beginnings.20 He grew up in Honolulu.21 He was of Chinese,
Caucasian, and Native Hawaiian ancestry. 22 He served in the
United States Army in World War 11.23 He was a graduate of the
University of Cincinnati School of Law. 24 He was active in politics
and was elected lieutenant governor of the State of Hawai'i in
251962. He was appointed as the second chief justice of the State of
Hawai'i in 1966 and served in that capacity for sixteen years. 26
27Thereafter, he became a trustee of the Bishop Estate. He is best
known, perhaps, as the founding father of the law school at the
19 The Chief Justice strenuously argued that judicial takings violated the
division between federal and state courts and enabled federal district courts to
become, in effect, the ultimate appellate courts of the state system. See infra
notes 105, 129-36 and accompanying text.
20 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 107-14; see
also CAROL S. DODD, THE RICHARDSON YEARS: 1966-1982, at 1-19 (1985).
21 Kahikino Noa Dettweiler, Note, Racial Classification or Cultural
Identification?: The Gathering Rights Jurisprudence of Two Twentieth Century
Hawaiian Supreme Court Justices, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POLY J. 174, 190 (2005)
(citing LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, HAWAII PoNo: A SOCIAL HISTORY 317 (1961)).
22 See Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie, Ka Lama Ki 0 Ka No'eau: The
Standing Torch of Wisdom, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 3, 4 (2010); James S. Bums,
William S. Richardson: A Leader in Hawai'i's Successful Post- WWII Political
and Judicial Revolution, 33 U. HAW. L. REv. 25,25 (2010).
23 See DODD, supra note 20, at 12; Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness,
supra note 14, at 104; MacKenzie, supra note 22, at 3.
24 See DODD, supra note 20, at 12.
25 Id. at 5-8; Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 108-
09 n.41; see also William S. Richardson Dies at 90, IMI PONO (June 27, 2010),
http://statehoodhawaii.org/2010/06/27/william-s-richardson-dies-at-90/.
26 MacKenzie, supra note 22, at 4.
27DODD, supra note 20, at 134-35.
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28University of Hawai'i. Yet today, some thirty years after he
finished his term as chief justice, his property rights decisions29
stand as his most important contribution to the State of Hawai'i.30
Today, his decision in Robinson v. Ariyoshi is the basis for the
regulation of water rights in Hawai'i. 3 1 His opinions in the beach
cases, In re Ashford,32 In re Sanborn,33 and County of Hawaii v.
28 See id at 83, 91-102. The law school is named after him. See Robert G.
Klein, William S. Richardson: Developing Hawai'i's Lawyers and Shaping the
Modern Hawai'i Court System, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 33, 33 (2010). For this act
he was acclaimed and beloved. See generally DODD, supra note 20, at 83, 91-
102.
29 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 99 n.2.
30 See id. at 99-100 & n.3. This footnote states:
See DAN BOYLAN & T. MICHAEL HOLMES, JOHN A. BURNS: THE MAN
AND His TIMES 304 (2000) (quoting Bambi Weil, a reporter who
eventually became a state judge, as saying that the Hawai'i Supreme
Court under Richardson "was an activist court in the best tradition of
the United States Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren");
Michael Tsai, Former Chief Justice William S. Richardson Dies,
HONOLULU STAR-ADVERTISER, June 21, 2010, available at http://
www.staradvertiser.com/news/FormerChief JusticeWilliam S Ric
hardson dies.html ("But it was as head of the state's highest court
that Richardson's impact was greatest. With Richardson at the helm
from 1966 to 1982, the Richardson court handed down a series of
judgments that assured public access to beaches, upheld traditional
Hawaiian laws on access to kuleana lands, and affirmed public
ownership of water and other natural resources. The decisions were
consistent with Richardson's controversial stand that western
exclusivity concepts were not always consistent or applicable in
Hawaii."); see also A. A. Smyser, Richardson Court Bent Rules in
Public's Favor, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Oct. 17, 1989, at A14
(comparing favorably the jurisprudence of Chief Justice Richardson
with that of Chief Justice Warren).
Id. at n.3.
31 See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 425 (Haw. 2000)
(citing Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310 (Haw. 1982)).
32 In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968).
3 In re Sanborn, 562 P.2d 771 (Haw. 1977).
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Sotomura,34 are accepted as the law dividing public and private
property on beaches. 35 His opinion in State v. Zimring36 held that
volcanic activity that added new lands to the state were lands that
belonged to the State of Hawai'i and not the abutting landowner. 37
However, when first rendered, these decisions-such as
McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson-were the center of a storm of
controversy.38 Critics, including the federal judges who ruled on
the takings claims, condemned these decisions as confiscatory
public policy decisions.39
Moreover, "[t]he losing parties in .. . McBryde [Sugar Co.] v.
Robinson, County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, and State . . . v.
Zimring[] would all sue . .. seeking [the] enforcement of [claimed]
34 County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57 (Haw. 1973).
35 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 100-02.
These cases moved the public/private demarcation from the lower seaweed line
to the higher vegetation line. See In re Sanborn, 562 P.2d at 777; County of
Hawaii, 517 P.2d at 63; In re Ashford, 440 P.2d at 76; see also DODD, supra
note 20, at 62-68.
36 Hawaii v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725, 727 (Haw. 1977).
7 Id. at 739.
38 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 101-02, 122
n.99 (quoting DODD, supra note 20, at 72) ("As the controversy continued,
especially after the land and water decisions, Bill Richardson would say, with a
smile, in private conversations: "If I had my way, the public would have even
greater access to water and shoreline property. Hawaiian kings, I'm sure,
intended to give their subjects more public seashore lands than we now allot. No
one but a fool would leave his canoe at the vegetation line and let the waves
wash it out to sea! The kings really must have intended to extend public
property to that area on the beach where canoes could be left without danger of
being washed away.").
39 See, e.g., Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559, 585-86 (D. Haw.
1977), affd in part, vacated in part, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477
U.S. 902 (1986) (stating that the majority of the Supreme Court of Hawai'i in
McBryde was "too concerned with the public policy aspects of [its] opinion" and
that "such confiscation" of property effected by the decision was inappropriate).
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vested rights."40 Forty years ago, the property legacy of Chief
Justice Richardson was neither celebrated nor acclaimed.41 So long
as the judicial takings claim in Robinson v. Ariyoshi persisted,
42there was no legacy, no acclamation. Instead, the reputation of
the court was the very opposite of judicial propriety. 43 The
Supreme Court of Hawai'i was viewed as a branch of state
government bent on confiscating vested rights without paying just
compensation." In the minds of its critics, the court was doing
what courts should never do-subverting the stability of the legal
system. 45
II. McBRYDE SUGAR CO. V. ROBINSON
McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson started as an action in a state
trial court "by which two sugar companies sought to settle
[competing claims to] ownership of . .. the surface water[s] of the
Hanapap6 River" in Hawai'i.46 Select territorial precedents
rendered in the early 1900s held that the "surplus waters" of
Hawai'i's streams and rivers-that is, the bulk of the surface
40 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 124
(footnotes omitted).
41 See id at 101, 124.
42 See id. at 124 & n.105 ("Typical of such opinion was the opinion of A.A.
Smyser, long the editor of the Honolulu Star Bulletin. Smyser objected to the
jurisprudence of Chief Justice Richardson. To him, it was destabilizing. Only
when the constitutional controversy was over did Smyser grudgingly accept the
decision in Robinson v. Ariyoshi.").
43 See id. at 101.
44 See id. at 124.
45 See supra note 42; see also infra notes 99-101.
46 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 125; see Chang,
Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 61 ("McBryde is the [Supreme Court of
Hawai'i] decision culminating some twenty years of litigation regarding the
extent to which various parties have rights to the water in the Hanap[e]p[e]
River. The parties involved were the State of Hawaii and the various landowners
whose property adjoined the river and streams." (footnote omitted)).
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waters-belonged to the owner of the lands on which such streams
or rivers originated.47
In those few decisions, the Territorial Supreme Court of
Hawai'i had ruled that the surplus waters were private property. 4 8
The owner of such waters could do with the waters as he or she
pleased.49 Surplus waters could be bought, sold, and transferred.o
Under Hawai'i law, as understood at the time, the water was
actually owned in a corporeal or res publicae sense.
Both sugar companies diverted water from the same river. 52 In
the 1940s, one sugar company had begun to divert more water than
before.53 The other sugar company sued, alleging that the diversion
was unwarranted.54 A trial was held. 5 The state trial court divided
the waters based on existing territorial law, which accorded surplus
rights based on lands owned.56 The losing party appealed to the
Supreme Court of Hawai'i in 1965." In 1973, the Supreme Court
of Hawai'i rendered its decision.58 The decision, in no small way,
stunned the parties. 59
47 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 125; see also
Carter v. Territory, 24 Haw. 47, 70 (1917); Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Co.
v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 15 Haw. 675, 680, 682-83 (1904).
48 See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1336 (Haw. 1973),
affd on reh'g, 517 P.2d 26 (Haw. 1973) (per curium).
49 Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Co., 15 Haw. at 680.
50 See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559, 570 (D. Haw. 1977), affd
in part, vacated in part, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 902
(1986).
5 See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 305-10 (Haw. 1982).
52 McBryde Sugar Co., 504 P.2d at 1134.
5 See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 517 P.2d 26, 29 (Haw. 1973)
(Levinson, J., dissenting).
1 See id at 28-29.
" See id at 29.
5 6Id. at 29 & nn.4-6; see also McBryde Sugar Co., 504 P.2d at 1333-34.
5 McBryde Sugar Co., 504 P.2d at 1333-34.
58 Id. at 1330.
59 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 125.
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"On appeal, Justice [Kazuhisa] Abe, writing for the [c]ourt,
overturned the" decisions of the Territorial Supreme Court of
Hawai'i that had purportedly established private ownership of the
surplus waters. 60 According to the court, there was no such private
ownership. 61 As to the waters in question, neither sugar company
owned them; those waters were "owned," the court stated, by the
State of Hawai'i. 62
63The king of Hawai'i had never parted with those waters. The
State, as successor to the king, was now the owner of such
waters.64 The sugar companies involved, and the whole of the
60 Id. at 125; see McBryde Sugar Co., 504 P.2d at 1333, 1335-39. As
previously explained by this author:
McBryde v. Robinson, a 1973 decision adjudicating water rights on
the island of Kaua'i, was actually written by Justice Kazuhisa Abe.
Nonetheless, the McBryde decision is today so closely associated
with Chief Justice Richardson that it is treated [by this author] as part
of his body of work. Although he did not author the decision, Chief
Justice Richardson clearly concurred in the result and the reasoning
of Justice Abe. When the decision was collaterally attacked in federal
district court, the [c]hief [j]ustice, under his authority as [c]hief
[a]dministrator of the Hawai'i []udiciary, actively became involved
in defending the decision. Most important, when the Ninth Circuit
directed certified questions to the [Supreme Court of Hawai'i] to
answer, the response was written by Chief Justice Richardson. Those
answers, reported in Robinson v. Ariyoshi, constitute the most
important decision of the [c]hief [j]ustice's body of work. Thus,
McBryde v. Robinson, which the chief justice did not author, and
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, which he did, are both treated as part of the
core of his jurisprudence.
Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 125 n.1 10.
61 See McBryde Sugar Co., 504 P.2d at 1336-39 (holding that the State of
Hawai'i owned the water); see also Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra
note 14, at 125.
62 McBryde Sugar Co., 504 P.2d at 1339; see also Chang, Perpetuated in
Righteousness, supra note 14, at 125.
63 See McBryde Sugar Co., 504 P.2d at 1337-39.
64 Id. at 1339.
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sugar industry, were shocked by the ruling. 6 5 Prior to the decision
in McBryde, the surplus waters of a river or stream were private
property. 66 Such could be bought, sold, or transferred from one
watershed to another by the owner of the lands on which such
surplus waters originated.67 Under the supreme court's ruling, there
was no such property interest as surplus water rights.68 Now, it
would be the State that owned the waters that were formerly held
as surplus waters by the sugar companies. 69 "None of the parties,
[not] even the State, had" argued such a position before the state
trial court.70
All parties had proceeded on the basis that the Territorial
Supreme Court of Hawai'i precedents which affirmed the existence
of surplus water rights were correct. 7 1 The parties sought a
rehearing before the Supreme Court of Hawai'i. 72
The sugar companies sought to argue in the rehearing that
their property had been taken without just compensation. 73 "[P]rior
65 See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559, 583 (D. Haw. 1977)
("McBryde I therefore came as a shocking, violent deviation from the solidly
established case law-totally unexpected and impossible to have been
anticipated. It was a radical departure from prior decisions."), affd in part,
vacated in part, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 902 (1986);
see also Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 125.
66 See Robinson, 441 F. Supp. at 570.
67 See id.
68 McBryde Sugar Co., 504 P.2d at 1339.
691Id. at 1338-39.
70 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 125; see also
Reply Memorandum for the Appellants and Petitioners at 1-2, McBryde Sugar
Co. v. Robinson, 517 P.2d 26 (1973) (per curiam) (Nos. 73-1440, 73-1441, 73-
1442).
71 See Robinson, 441 F. Supp. at 563; McBryde Sugar Co., 517 P.2d at 27,
29-31 (Levinson, J., dissenting); Reply Memorandum for the Appellants and
Petitioners, supra note 70, at 4; see also note 46 and accompanying text.
72 McBryde Sugar Co., 517 P.2d at 27.
7 Reply Memorandum for the Appellants and Petitioners, supra note 70, at
5.
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to the decision[,] they had [surplus] water rights." 74 After the
decision, surplus waters did not exist as a property right.75
"Surely[] ... this was as much of a taking as if the State[, through
its executive or legislative branches, had exercised eminent domain
and] actually condemned their rights."7 6 If the waters that formerly
constituted surplus waters now belong to the State of Hawai'i,
surely the State has "taken" such waters and must pay
compensation.
Moreover, there was a second cause of action.7 8 In its sua
sponte ruling, the state supreme court had allegedly violated
procedural due process. 79 The parties before the court never had
the opportunity to be heard on the state supreme court's view that
surplus waters did not exist.8
The Supreme Court of Hawai'i granted a rehearing, but limited
the issues to be heard.81 The substantive due process (takings) and
procedural due process claims were off limits. 82 The court would
not hear argument on these claims. 83 The supreme court would
consider argument on the proper interpretation of the statute used
by the supreme court to rule that the concept of surplus waters was
74 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 125.
7 See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1345-46 (Haw.
1973), affd on reh'g, 517 P.2d 26 (Haw. 1973) (per curium); see also Robinson,
441 F. Supp. at 570.
76 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 125.
7 See id. at 125-26.
78 See id. at 126.
7 9 Robinson, 441 F. Supp. at 580.
so Id.
81 See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 517 P.2d 26, 27 (Haw. 1973).
82 See id; Reply Memorandum for the Appellants and Petitioners, supra
note 70, at 2; see also Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at
126.
83 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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erroneous. 84 The Supreme Court of Hawai'i reaffirmed its original
judgment.8 5
One justice who was formerly among the majority now
dissented on rehearing.86 Associate Justice Bernard Levinson
changed his position.8 7 Justice "Levinson ... argu[ed] passionately
that the sugar companies had vested . . . rights" in both the
ownership of the surplus waters and the right to transfer such
waters out of the watershed. Levinson asserted that this was an
unconstitutional judicial taking, citing to the judicial takings theory
first proposed by Justice Stewart in Hughes v. Washington.89 In
McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, the Supreme Court of Hawai'i
had, by its very decision, taken the property of the sugar
companies without just compensation in violation of the United
States Constitution.90
84 See McBryde Sugar Co., 517 P.2d at 27; see also Chang, Perpetuated in
Righteousness, supra note 14, at 126. On rehearing, the Supreme Court of
Hawai'i did not permit argument on the substantive and procedural due process
claims, confining argument to issues of state law. See supra notes 82-83 and
accompanying text.
8 McBryde Sugar Co., 517 P.2d at 27. Judge Pence was later to call this
rehearing "almost farcical." Robinson, 441 F. Supp. at 580.
86 See McBryde Sugar Co., 517 P.2d at 27 (Levinson, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[a]lthough [he previously] voted with the majority of th[e] court,
[he was] constrained to recant that position in view of [his] current
understanding of the problems of th[e] case").
" See id.
88 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 126; see
McBryde Sugar Co., 517 P.2d at 51 (Levinson, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 48-50 (citing Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-98
(1967)); see Hughes, 389 U.S. at 290.
9 McBryde, 517 P.2d at 48, 50 (Levinson, J., dissenting). Justice Levinson
quoted Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Hughes v. Washington:
For a [s]tate cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional
prohibition against taking property without due process of law by the
simple device of asserting retroactively that the property it has taken
never existed at all. Whether the decision here worked an
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Judge Pence, the federal district court trial judge in the
subsequent federal collateral attack on the Supreme Court of
Hawai'i decision, called the opinion of Justice Levinson "probably
the finest . .. of [Levinson's] judicial career." 9 1
The losing parties sought a writ of certiorari in the Supreme
Court of the United States. 92 They asserted that the Supreme Court
of Hawai'i had violated both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution 93 by, in effect, taking property as
well as denying the losing parties the right to be heard on
rehearing. 94 The Supreme Court of the United States denied the
petition for certiorari. 9 5
Before the Supreme Court ruled on the petition for certiorari,
the two sugar companies joined as plaintiffs and sued the State of
Hawai'i in federal district court. 96 They alleged that the State of
Hawai'i, by and through its state supreme court, had (1) taken
property in violation of the Fifth Amendment (substantive due
process) and (2) denied procedural due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.9 7 In
1977, the federal district court judge, Judge Martin Pence, ruled in
favor of the sugar companies, enjoining the enforcement of the
unpredictable change in state law thus inevitably presents a federal
question for the determination of this [c]ourt.
Id at 50 (quoting Hughes, 389 U.S. at 296-97).
9' Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559, 564 (D. Haw. 1977), affd in
part, vacated in part, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 902
(1986).
92 See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Hawaii, 417 U.S. 962, 962 (1974)
(dismissing appeal and denying certiorari).
93 See Reply Memorandum for the Appellants and Petitioners, supra note
70, at 1-4; Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 126-127.
94 See sources cited supra note 93.
9 McBryde Sugar Co., 417 U.S. at 962 (dismissing appeal and denying
writ of certiorari).
96 See Robinson, 441 F. Supp. at 561-62.
9 Id. at 580.
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Supreme Court of Hawai'i decision.98 In his opinion, Judge Pence
harshly criticized the Supreme Court of Hawai'i; 99 he stated that
the ruling "was strictly a 'public policy' decision with no prior
underlying 'legal' justification." 00 In addition, Judge Pence called
it "one of the grossest examples of unfettered judicial construction
used to achieve the result desired-regardless of its effect upon the
parties, or the state of the prior law on the subject."o10
" Id. at 586.
9 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 127.
100 Robinson, 441 F. Supp. at 566. He stated:
It may be that the court did not conceive its action as a taking-it
said the plaintiffs never had had any such water rights, ergo, no
taking! Just that simple!
The Constitution does not measure the taking of property by what
a court may say or even what it may intend; the measure is by the
result.
Id. at 585 (emphasis omitted).
1ot Id. at 568.
Pence criticized the court vehemently[:] . . . "[T]he majority (three
justices) in McBryde II refused to consider [the constitutional
arguments of the parties with regard to McBryde 1] and summarily
and most tersely, in a completely unenlightening per curiam opinion,
held . . . ." [He also stated:]
Thusly did the court 'proceed to spit the victim for the
barbecue' . . . .
From the manner in which the court wrote the majority
opinion in McBryde I, it was obvious that the court
determined, without notice to any party of its intent, that it was
going to completely restructure what was universally thought
to be the well settled law of waters of Hawaii. . . . It was
strictly a 'public policy' decision with no prior underlying
'legal' justification therefor. . . . In this case stare decisis
interfered with the court's policy!
The entire rationale of the majority is one of the grossest
examples of unfettered judicial construction used to achieve
the result desired-regardless of its effect upon the parties or
the state of the prior law on the subject.
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By enjoining state officials from ever enforcing the judgment
in McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, Judge Pence had, much like an
appellate court, "reversed" the Supreme Court of Hawai'i.102
To Chief Justice William S. Richardson, the implications were
clear-a point that he was to make clear in his briefs before the
Ninth Circuit.103
Although the named defendants were the [g]overnor .
and the members of the Board of Land and Natural
Resources, the real defendant was[, in effect,] the . . .
Supreme Court [of Hawai'i. A] federal district court, the
lowest court in the federal system, had reversed a state
supreme court, the highest court of the state system. If a
federal district court could set aside a judgment of the
[Supreme Court of Hawai'i], . . . then federal trial courts
would be, in fact, the highest court of the state system.104
First, Chief Justice "Richardson firmly believed that the
[Supreme Court of Hawai'i] had acted constitutionally" and
appropriately. os Property law is state law, not federal law.106 It
Williamson B.C. Chang, Reversals of Fortune: The Hawaii Supreme Court, the
Memorandum Opinion, and the Realignment of Political Power in Post-
Statehood Hawai'i, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 17, 30 n.31 (1992) [hereinafter Chang,
Reversals ofFortune] (quoting Robinson, 441 F. Supp. at 564, 565-68).
102 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 127.
103id
104 Id. Chief Justice Richardson has been quoted as saying, "And I felt that
the highest court of a state should be higher than the lowest court in the federal
system." Id. at 127 n.127.
105 Id.
106 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597 (2010) (stating that "state law defines property interests");
Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42, 48 (1944) (showing
that state law governs property law and that "rights to succession by will are
created by the state and may be limited, conditioned, or abolished by it."); Fox
River Paper Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Wis., 274 U.S. 651, 655 (1927) ("[T]he
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was the province of the state courts to rule on matters of property
law. State courts were final on matters of property law-and
should be accorded the same finality that is granted to the Supreme
Court of the United States.
Second, the chief justice did not see his decisions as taking
property. 107 Rather, his decisions as to property rights were
corrective-overturning erroneous property decisions rendered
during Hawai'i's territorial period. os Courts do not "take" property,
rather they "declare" what has always been the case. 109 In this case,
water rights had never been private property-that was an
erroneous reading of the king's intention at the time of the
Mdhele. 1 0 Many of the chief justice's "landmark cases," Palama v.
Sheehan,"' In re Ashford, Sotomura, In re Sanborn, Zimring,
Reppun v. Board of Water Supply, 12 and Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust
Co.,113 overturned or modified territorial "law in some fashion."1 1 4
If McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson could be set aside by a federal
district court, other decisions could be collaterally attacked in the
same fashion. 5 In such a case, "the independence and sovereignty
nature and extent of the rights of the state and of riparian owners in navigable
waters within the state and to the soil beneath are matters of state law to be
determined by the statutes and judicial decisions of the state."); see also Chang,
Missing the Boat, supra note 8, at 158 n.120 (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972), for the proposition that "property interests are created by
the state").
107 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 129-33.
10s See id. at 137-38.
109 Id. at 119-33, 137-38.
1 oSee id at 111-13, 117-19, 129-33, 137-38.
Palama v. Sheehan, 440 P.2d 95 (Haw. 1968).
112 Reppun v. Bd. of Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57 (Haw. 1982).
13 Kalipi v. Haw. Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745 (Haw. 1982).
114 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 128.
115 See id; see also Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 57-58.
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of the Hawai'i [j]udiciary would be subservient to the federal
district [and appellate] courts."ll 6
The collateral attack in Robinson v. Ariyoshi led others to file
in federal district court alleging a judicial taking.' 1 7 A federal
action was filed in Sotomura v. County of Hawaii1 8 seeking
compensation and equitable relief."l 9 Sotomura, a Supreme Court
of Hawai'i decision written by Chief Justice Richardson, had
moved the demarcation between private and public property from
the debris line to the higher vegetation line, diminishing the size of
the Sotomuras' property.120 The Sotomuras sued alleging a judicial
taking.121
The Zimrings, the losing parties in State v. Zimring, also
brought an action in federal district court.122 In Hawaii v. Zimring,
the Supreme Court of Hawai'i had held that newly created volcanic
lands added to the State of Hawai'i belonged to the State, not the
abutting landowner.123 Previous state practice deemed the abutting
landowner to be the owner of these newly added volcanic lands.124
Thus, in light of these collateral actions, the late 1970s was a
critical moment for the Supreme Court of Hawai'i and the property
jurisprudence of Chief Justice Richardson. The independence,
sovereignty, and ability of the Supreme Court of Hawai'i to correct
116 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 128.
117 See id.
118 Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 402 F. Supp. 95 (D. Haw. 1975).
19 Id. at 97.
120 County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 62 (Haw. 1973).
121 See Sotomura, 402 F. Supp. at 97 & n.1.
122 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 128.
123 Hawaii v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725, 727, 731 (Haw. 1977).
124 Id. at 740-41 (Vitousek, J., dissenting). The three attacks all raised the
same issue-whether the Supreme Court of Hawai'i, in implementing the
jurisprudence of the kingdom over that of the territory, took the property of the
plaintiffs in violation of the United States Constitution. See Chang, Perpetuated
in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 128-29. This author was retained as counsel
in the two new actions. See id. at 128.
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prior errors in state property law were on trial in the federal
courts.125
III. THERE Is No SUCH CAUSE OF ACTION AS A JUDICIAL TAKING
First, the chief justice's primary opposition to the concept of a
judicial taking was that the state supreme courts were not
subordinate to the federal district courts.' 2 6 That is, the federal
district courts could not, as the federal district court in Robinson
had, enjoin the enforcement of state supreme court decisions.127
The federal district courts could not act as appellate courts of the
state supreme courts.128 The State defendants and Chief Justice
Richardson asserted that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,129
such appeals and reversals by a federal district court were
impermissible.130 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.131 held that federal
district courts lacked the jurisdiction to entertain such "horizontal"
appeals of state supreme court decisions.132 Moreover, such
collateral attacks violated the fundamental principle that state
courts were final on questions of state property law.1 33
Second, the chief justice, by way of his amicus brief, also
argued that if losing parties were allowed to attack a final state
supreme court decision by refiling a "new" action in a federal
district court, under the fiction that the collateral attack was an
original cause of action, there would always be two ways of
125 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 128.
126 See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 303-04 (Haw. 1982); see also
supra note 104.
127 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 128.
128 See Chang, Rediscovering Rooker, supra note 8, at 1362.
19 See id. at 1339 (discussing the Rooker doctrine, which "prohibit[s]
lower federal courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction").
130 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 128-29.
131 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
132 Id. at 416.
133 Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 58-59.
674 [Vol. 21
ROBINSON V. ARIYOSHI REVISITED
"appealing" state supreme court decisions.' 34 If there were two
avenues to appealing a decision, if every losing party had "two
bites of the apple," "there would be no finality in the legal
system." 135
Namely, such collateral attacks on judgments in federal court
allowed a second avenue by which to appeal cases. 13 6 A party that
had lost before a state supreme court, or even before a state
appellate or trial court, could appeal upwards, as is normally the
case, or refile a new and "original" action in either a state or
federal trial court alleging a taking of property in violation of the
United States Constitution.
Then, the losing party in this new action would have the same
options-an appeal upwards or the opportunity to refile a new and
original action in a state or federal trial court under the theory that
the court had taken property. This could go on and on, with losing
parties filing new actions alleging a judicial taking by the court in
which these parties had just lost. This would undermine the finality
essential to a judicial system.' 37
134 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 128-29.
135 Id. at 129; see also Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 58-
59.
136 Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 58-59. If that losing party
can turn around and file a new action alleging that the court rendering the taking
judgment had violated the Constitution, then there would be no end, "no finality
in the legal system," for every losing party could bring suit again. Chang,
Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 128-29. Then, the party losing
in that action could bring suit-over and over again.
137 See Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 59; see also Chang,
Rediscovering Rooker, supra note 8, at 1348.
If there is a lesson to be learned from examining Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, it is that courts cannot take. It is not that they cannot take
property because they cannot act in a manner which has the same
results or ramifications of a governmental taking. Rather, they do not
take because the implications of the contrary proposition contradict
the essential functions of the judiciary. Simply put, courts do not take
because that would destroy their ability to resolve disputes. Courts do
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Third, the chief justice as amicus curiae also argued that the
concept of a judicial taking was essentially incoherent.138 A
decision of a state supreme court when it retroactively overrules
prior property law "does not take from one party and give to
another."l 39 Rather, when a court overrules prior precedent, it is
correcting prior erroneous precedent. 140 The losing party never had
the right to the property it claimed. 141 If courts take when they
rule, then every case is a potential judicial taking.14 2
Nevertheless, those advocating the existence of judicial
takings had a powerful argument in their favor: the "layman's
view" of a taking.143 This view stems from what appears eminently
sensible and logical.14 4 Before the offending judicial decision, a
party had property rights. 145 After that decision, they have no such
not take; they declare. If courts were said to take, they could not
effectively declare.
. . . The implications of Robinson-type intervention are that there
would be no judicial hierarchy and no finality in appellate systems.
Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 90-91.
138 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 129.
139 d
140 Id. at 127-28, 130-31, 137-38.
141 See id at 129-30; see also Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559, 585
(D. Haw. 1977), affd in part, vacated in part, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985),
vacated, 477 U.S. 902 (1986); Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 68.
142 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 129.
143 See Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 65 (stating that this
view is "based primarily on simplicity and clarity"); see also Chang, Missing the
Boat, supra note 8, at 157-59 (describing the " 'layman's' concept of a taking" as
one that "discards rules in favor of an intuitive, experiential understanding of a
taking").
'" See supra note 143; see also infra note 150.
145 Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 65.
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rights. 146 This must be a taking.147 It does not matter which branch
of government effected the taking. 148
This was the logic of Justice Stewart in Hughes v.
Washington-a version of "I know it when I see it."l 4 9 If it looks




148 Id. at 65-67; see Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
149 Chang, Missing the Boat, supra note 8, at 157-59; see also Chang,
Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 65-67.
Iso See Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 65. This author has
further described this concept in the following manner:
The term "lay" as used by Professor Bruce A. Ackerman is not
unflattering, but rather describes an eminently sensible conclusion
based primarily on simplicity and clarity. The laymen's view
requires no deep legal scholarship to reach its conclusion. The
concept is based on the fundamental legal principle of securing
private property from governmental interference. The laymen's
perspective reflects such a prominent societal value that one
assumes it must be expressed somewhere in the Constitution. It is
so because it must be so. It could not be otherwise in a legal
system based on private property. As Professor Laurence H. Tribe
has put it:
Most people know a taking when they see one, or at least
they think they do. Before the taking, an object or a piece of
land belonged to X, who could use it in a large number of
ways and who enjoyed legal protection in preventing
others from doing things to it without X's permission. After
the taking, X's relationship to the object or the land was
fundamentally transformed; he could no longer use it at
all, and other people could invoke legal arguments and
mechanisms to keep him away from it exactly as he had
been able to invoke such arguments and mechanisms before
the taking had occurred. As Professor Bruce Ackerman has
shown in a thoughtful analysis of the taking problem,
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Judicial takings are a paradox-an idea that exists
intellectually, but not in reality.151 It is like the following riddle:
"What happens when an irresistible force meets an immovable
object?"1 52 The answer is that there can never be a possible world
in which both an irresistible force and an immovable object
exist.'5 3 For, if we assume the existence of an irresistible force, we
are assuming that in such a world where there is such a force, there
are no immovable objects.154 To posit the existence of an
irresistible force is to by inference posit that there are no
immovable objects.15 5
The concept of judicial takings has the same flaw; when we
speak about judicial takings, one commits the same error. If one
posits a world in which there are courts-namely, a judiciary-
there can be no judicial takings, for what we mean by "courts" are
institutions that declare what the law is; they do not make law and,
therefore, do not take property rights by their decisions.156
much of the constitutional law of takings is built upon this
ordinary, lay view of what a 'taking' is all about.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 456, 459-60 (1978)).
151 See Chang, Missing the Boat, supra note 8, at 158-59.
152 See Dave Scriven, The Irresistible Force Paradox, WORD TRAVELER





156 This author further explains this phenomenon as follows:
In a sense, a paradox is created. Property is defined as those
interests deemed to be property by the state courts. At the same time,
the federal courts assert that some interests are inherently "property,"
regardless of the definition state courts apply. The paradox is similar
to a person who asserts that all bachelors are men (because that is
how "bachelor" is defined) but also claims that it is also true as a
matter of experience that some bachelors are not men. In other words,
logic commands one result, but our experience dictates another.
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IV. THE STAKES WERE ENORMOUS
Incoherent or not, to the affected parties-the Hawai'i sugar
industry in particular-the stakes were enormous.157 "The two
sugar companies, now joined by other sugar companies from
around the state," threw everything into the fight. 58 The sugar
industry viewed McBryde as a matter of life or death.15 9 "The
economic ramifications ... were huge because all sugar companies
... relied on private ownership of surface waters" and the right to
transport waters out of the watershed. 160
"[T]he sugar companies retained the former dean of Harvard
Law School, Solicitor General Erwin Griswold, as co-counsel."l 61
The sugar companies even "brought disciplinary charges
alleging that [counsel for Chief Justice Richardson (this author)]
had violated the canons of ethics for publishing law review articles
on related issues," thus creating an atmosphere in which no fair
proceeding could take place.162 "Attorneys for the sugar industry
Chang, Missing the Boat, supra note 8, at 158.
157 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 129.
15 id.
159 See id.
160 Id; see McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1345, affd on
reh'g, 517 P.2d 26 (Haw. 1973) (per curium) (denying the sugar companies the
right to transport needed water to other watersheds).
161 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 129.
162 Id.; see also Chang, Reversals ofFortune, supra note 101, at 48-49 n.69
("As to the second 'effort . . . to stop Professor Chang's article,' [this author]
would assume that Judge Pence is referring to the decision to initiate a
disciplinary complaint against [this author] before the office of the [d]isciplinary
[c]ounsel. Mr. Russell Cades presented arguments at the hearing alleging that
the publication of the aforementioned article, as well as a subsequent article,
[Chang, Rediscovering Rooker, supra note 8, at 1337], again violated ethical
canons and disciplinary rules by attempting to influence the judicial process
through the [media] and therefore create an atmosphere in which no fair
proceeding could take place. Secondly, Mr. Cades asserted that the deliberate
citation to [this author's] own articles in briefs submitted in the Ninth Circuit
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even sought to stifle ... publications" of counsel for amicus curiae
Chief Justice Richardson. 163 They "succeeded in blocking the
publication of one article in the Hawaii Bar Journal"164 and
received attorneys' fees for those efforts.' 65 These extraordinary
intentionally violated their page limitations. Finally, he asserted that the use of
two attorneys to represent state officials created confusion and conflict of
interest. Professor Addison Bowman, a former criminal defense attorney in
Washington D.C., represented [this author] at the proceeding. When asked if Mr.
Cades was billing his clients for this action, Mr. Cades, at that time, refused to
answer. The disciplinary counsel issued a one-sentence decision dismissing the
allegations.").
163 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 129.
164 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 129; see also
Chang, Reversals ofFortune, supra note 101, at 48 n.69.
[A]ttomeys from the firms of Cades, Goodsill, and Hoddick appeared
at a meeting of the Board of Editors of the Hawaii Bar Journal to
argue that an article that had been accepted for publication, written by
[this author] as one of the editors of the journal,... be excluded from
the next issue of the journal. The attorneys argued that the article
constituted (1) a violation of ethical canons in that it created a biased
atmosphere in the midst of a judicial proceeding [although the case
was then in the Ninth Circuit] and (2) constituted a violation of the
page limitation [of the] rules of the Ninth Circuit since when the
article was cited in the brief that was submitted by [this author] as
counsel, the additional pages accorded to the article exceeded the
forty-page limit of the Ninth Circuit. In any event, the editors of the
Bar Journal, [except this author] voted to quash publication of the
article.
Chang, Reversals ofFortune, supra note 101, at 48 n.69.
165 Chang, Reversals of Fortune, supra note 101, at 47-48 n.69 (quoting
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 703 F. Supp. 1412, 1430 (D. Haw. 1989) ("The court is
well aware of the fact that in this case, Professor Chang was more than an
erudite professor of law at the University of Hawaii's School of Law. Chang was
selected by and purportedly represented Chief Justice Richardson, and paid by
the State in order to assist the State's Attorney General in the State's [d]efense.
This court can take judicial notice that some of the circuit judges of the Ninth
Circuit during the pertinent years appeared to hold law review articles and
conclusions therein in high esteem, since law review articles are normally
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tactics were not characteristic of litigation in Hawai'i.166 Such
tactics simply reflected the huge stakes involved.
Chief Justice Richardson knew that the question of judicial
takings-namely, whether his court in McBryde had taken vested
rights-would be a difficult issue for the Supreme Court of the
United States. The Supreme Court had never, in a case like
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, held that a retroactive overruling of prior law
was a taking. 167 Thus, it was predictable that the Supreme Court of
the United States would look for a doctrinal way out. Both the
chief justice and his counsel believed that the Court would, as has
been its practice, look for a means to avoid deciding a hard
constitutional question-a means by which it could avoid holding
that the Supreme Court of Hawai'i had, by its decision, taken
property.168
Such a ruling would result in chaos as to the relationship
between state supreme courts, the federal district courts, and the
Supreme Court of the United States.169 As a matter of practice, the
Supreme Court of the United States has looked to
written from an impartial scholar's standpoint. Anything written by Professor
Chang during the time relevant here, however, could and would be only
construed as written on a solidly partisan basis from the standpoint of an
advocate representing his client. This court agrees with McBryde that the
publication was intended to be, and was in effect, an additional brief for the
State, after oral argument. The court of appeals even allowed McBryde to reply
after the publication."), rev'd and vacated, 933 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1991)).
166 See Damien P. Horigan, Some Aspects ofLaw in Hawaii, 5 J. S. PAC. L.
1,7(2001).
167 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 130.
168 See id.
169 See supra notes 126-37 and accompanying text; see also Chang,




nonconstitutional grounds, when available, by which to decide
hard cases. 170
The means of avoiding the judicial takings question rested in
the ambiguity of the Supreme Court of Hawai'i's use of the term
"state ownership" in the original McBryde opinion. Did state
ownership mean ownership in a corporeal, res publicae sense, or
did it refer to communal possession, more akin to a public trust?
The essence of the judicial takings claim rested on the single
assumption that the McBryde decision had used the term
"ownership" in a corporeal sense. 172 Hawai'i courts during the
republican and territorial period from 1894 to 1959 had taken the
concept of communal ownership of water rights and turned it into
private property-a right based on corporeal ownership. 173 This
was an erroneous interpretation of the mid-nineteenth century
intent of the monarch.174 Although during the Mdhele, the monarch
had created private fee interests in land, there never was such an
intent as to water.' 75
Under the Hawaiian view, at the time of the Mdhele, the first
privatization of land in Hawai'i, no one, not even the king,
"owned" water in a corporeal sense.1 76 "When Justice Abe in
170 See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945) ("This Court
from the time of its foundation has adhered to the principle that it will not
review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and independent state
grounds. The reason is so obvious that it has rarely been thought to warrant
statement. It is found in the partitioning of power between the state and federal
judicial systems and in the limitations of our own jurisdiction. Our only power
over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly
adjudge federal rights." (citations omitted)).
17' See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 130-33.
12 Id at 130.
.. Id. at 112-13, 123, 130-32.
174 Id. at 112-13, 130-32.
" Id. at 117-18, 130-32.
Id. at 118, 130.
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McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson awarded the [S]tate 'ownership' of
the surface waters of the stream, [most who read the decision]
interpreted the term 'ownership' in its [corporeal] sense, in the
sense used by the Territorial Supreme Court" of Hawai'i in the few
cases that established surplus water rights. 177
However, there was substantial doubt as to whether Justice
Abe meant ownership in a corporeal sense when he used the term
state ownership in McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson. In his opinion,
Justice Abe intimated that under the English common law on
which he based the opinion, water could not be owned-it was
After the [k]ingdom, during the post-overthrow period, Western
laws were used to reconstruct Hawaiian custom and practice. Thus
began the misinterpretations, such as the assertion that the king was
the owner of all property. As to water rights, this was false. The king
held the waters in trust. Westerners also misconstrued the nature of
the konohiki's relationship with water. Territorial precedents declared
that since the king owned the waters, the king's grants to lesser chiefs,
the konohiki, conveyed ownership of the bulk of the surface waters.
Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 118.
17 See id. at 130 (citing Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 86-
87).
Petitioners and the court in Robinson assumed that the mere
declaration of ownership in the State by virtue of the McBryde
decision constituted a confiscatory act. This is not necessarily true.
The term "ownership," without clarification, is meaningless in water
rights. Ownership of water by the State, as evidenced in most other
jurisdictions asserting ownership, simply means that the State has the
power to control and regulate the waters if it chooses to do so at all.
Hence, the issue of confiscation was not ripe. Life on the
Hanap[f]p[d] River goes on as before. If the State chose to control
and regulate the water in such a manner as to completely prevent
petitioners from using the water, such conduct might constitute a
confiscatory act for which [F]ifth [A]mendment protection could be
invoked. At that point a suit to determine whether a taking has
occurred would be more appropriate. Until then, the injunction in
Robinson is a suit to enjoin undefined state action.
Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 86-87 (footnotes omitted).
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publicijuris.178 Publici juris, unlike res publicae,179 or ownership
in a corporeal sense, is similar to a public trust. 80
Uncertainty in the aftermath of landmark judicial decisions is
not uncommon. For example, the meaning of Brown v. Board of
Education,' 8 while simple, was not clear.182 It took many cases to
refine what the Court meant there by "equality."l 83
McBryde was a landmark decision, and like other such
landmark decisions, there was uncertainty as to what the Supreme
Court of Hawai'i had meant when it awarded the state ownership of
the surface waters.' 84 State ownership of waters even in a Western
sense cannot be equated with ownership in a corporeal, actual
sense.185 Thus, for example, some Western states declare, either by
common law or in their constitutions, that the State is the owner of
all waters.186 This does not preclude others from having vested use
178 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 130 & n.137
(quoting McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1399, affd on reh'g,
517 P.2d 26 (1973) (per curium)) ("It appears that this Act was very similar to
the English common law rules which had evolved by that time that no one may
acquire property to running water in a natural water course; that flowing water
was publicijuris; and that it was common property to be used by all who had a
right of access to it, as usufruct of the watercourse." (emphasis added)).
179 See Frank J. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of
Water, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 638, 640 (1957).
18o Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 92-93.
181 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
182 See Stephen J. Caldas & Carl L. Bankston III, A Re-Analysis of the
Legal, Political, and Social Landscape of Desegregation from Plessy v.
Ferguson to Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 217, 224-25 (2007); Chang, Unraveling
Robinson, supra note 14, at 95 n.185.
183 See Douglas Bryant, III, "A Failure to Act" from Brown v. Board of
Education to Sheff v. O'Neill: The American Educational System Will Remain
Segregated, 25 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 1, 13-14, 16-17, 22-23 (2008).
184 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 130-31.
' See id. at 130.
186 See Trelease, supra note 179, at 639.
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rights in such waters.'8 State ownership of water is not like a
state's ownership of its fleet of cars. 188
"Ownership" was how Westerners often mischaracterized the
king's relationship with the lands and waters of Hawai'i.189 "The
king was not the owner of the waters of Hawai'i."' 90 He was its
trustee.191 "Trusteeship recognized both the beneficiaries' interest
11 7 Id. at 640.
18 See id. at 638-39.
189 See supra note 176 and accompanying text; see also Reppun v. Bd. of
Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57, 67-69 (1982).
In McBryde, we did not lightly infer that a judicially determined
system of water rights was subject to alteration. Quite to the contrary,
our decision there was premised on the firm conviction that prior
courts had largely ignored the mandates of the rulers of the [k]ingdom
and the traditions of the native Hawaiians in their zeal to convert
these islands into a manageable western society.
... Ostensibly, this judge-made system of rights was an outgrowth of
Hawaiian custom in dealing with water. However, the creation of
private and exclusive interests in water, within a context of [W]estern
concepts regarding property, compelled the drawing of fixed lines of
authority and interests which were not consonant with Hawaiian
custom.
. . . Again, the essential nature of the konohiki's customary powers
over the waters of his ahupuaa was disregarded, and an individual
was granted a personal "right" to profit, presumably by virtue of
ancient authority, from the sale and application of water without
regard for the consequences to those who historically would have
been within his charge.
We cannot continue to ignore what we firmly believe were
fundamental mistakes regarding one of the most precious of our
resources. McBryde was a necessary and proper step in the
rectification of basic misconceptions concerning water "rights" in
Hawai'i.
Reppun, 656 P.2d at 67-69 (footnote omitted).




in the waters and the fiduciary duty of the trustee to
beneficiaries."1 92
The property jurisprudence of the chief justice often reflected
the view that Western lawyers often misinterpreted Hawaiian
communal practices in the sharing of resources. 193 Often
Westerners interpreted such practices as ownership that arose from
the appearance that chiefs controlled resources. 1 94 Chiefly control
of resources, while appearing to be a kind of ownership familiar to
the West, was actually a form of trusteeship quite different from
Western notions of corporeal ownership.1 95 It has always been
clear, to Hawaiians, that the sovereign held the land and the water
in trust. 196
192 Id see also Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310 (Haw. 1982).
The McBryde opinion, however, did not supplant the konohikis
with the State as the owner of surplus waters in the sense that the
State is now free to do as it pleases with the waters of our lands. In
McBryde . .. we indeed held that at the time of the introduction of fee
simple ownership to these islands the king reserved the ownership of
all surface waters. But we believe that by this reservation, a public
trust was imposed upon all the waters of the kingdom. That is, we
find the public interest in the waters of the kingdom was understood
to necessitate a retention of authority and the imposition of a
concomitant duty to maintain the purity and flow of our waters for
future generations and to assure that the waters of our land are put to
reasonable and beneficial uses. This is not ownership in the corporeal
sense where the State may do with the property as it pleases; rather,
we comprehend the nature of such authority to assure the continued
existence and beneficial application of the resource for the common
good.
Robinson, 658 P.2d at 310.
193 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 111.
194 See id. at 111-13.
195 Chang, Missing the Boat, supra note 8, at 164 ("In Hawaii, the societal
background to the rules regarding water rights had completely changed by the
time of the McBryde decision.").
196 id
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Thus, [counsel for Amicus Curiae William S.
Richardson] raised [the possibility] in oral argument
before the Ninth Circuit [that McBryde Sugar Co. v.
Robinson had been misread]. The sugar companies used
"ownership" to mean ownership and possession of the
water in a real, corporeal sense. . . . [If by "ownership"]
the [Supreme Court of Hawai'i only] meant to .. . give the
[S]tate a public trust over the surface waters . .. then there
was no taking of property. The assertion of the public
trust was akin to an assertion of a police power over the
waters. The [S]tate always had a police power over its
resources [such as water]. [A] decision [declaring that the
S]tate [had a] police power over the surface waters of
Hawai'i did not give the [S]tate something it did not
already have . . . .197
If there was ambiguity about the meaning of ownership,
counsel for amicus curiae Chief Justice Richardson argued that the
Ninth Circuit should certify questions to the Supreme Court of
Hawai'i for clarification.1 98 Certainly, the Ninth Circuit should be
clear as to the meaning of ownership before undertaking the drastic
step of affirming an injunction against the enforcement of a
decision of the Supreme Court of Hawai'i.
Thus, amicus curiae Richardson, himself a member of the
court, was in the odd position of recommending that the Ninth
Circuit certify questions back to the state supreme court for
clarification. The Ninth Circuit did certify questions to the
197 id.
"' Id. at 140 & n.140 ("See HAW. R. APP. P. 13(a) ('When a federal district
or appellate court certifies to the [Supreme Court of Hawai'i] that there is
involved in any proceeding before it a question concerning the law of Hawai'i
that is determinative of the cause and that there is no clear, controlling precedent
in the Hawai'i judicial decisions, the [Supreme Court of Hawai'i] may answer
the certified question by written opinion.')").
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Supreme Court of Hawai'i as to what that court had meant by
ownership in the McBryde decision.199 The sugar companies
vigorously objected.200
It was, after all, this very court which had denied the sugar
companies substantive and procedural due process. 20 1 The act of
certification would simply place the sugar companies before the
institution that had inflicted harm on them in the first place.
Consequently, the sugar companies made a motion to recuse Chief
Justice Richardson.202 The Supreme Court of Hawai'i denied that
203
motion.
199 Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 292 (Haw. 1982).
200 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 131-32
(noting the reaction of the sugar companies to the certification order).
201 See id. at 131.
202 See generally id. at 132 & n.141. That footnote states:
Motion to Recuse the Honorable William S. Richardson at 7,
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982) (No. 8241)
("As detailed herein and in the affidavit submitted herewith the
Honorable William S. Richardson appeared as amicus curiae in the
Ninth Circuit proceedings in this case. The appellees by their
attorneys respectfully submit that Chief Justice Richardson is under a
duty to recuse himself from participating in this Court's proceedings
on the certified questions.").
Id. at 132 n.141.
203 See generally id. at 132 n.142. That footnote states:
See Order of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i, Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982) (No. 8241) ("The
questions asked by the Ninth Circuit relate in part to the interpretation
of a 1973 decision by this court in which the [c]hief [j]ustice
participated. It would seem appropriate for him to continue to sit in
the instant proceeding to assist in giving the Ninth Circuit meaningful
answers to questions which [it has] asked this court to answer. If he
were to recuse himself, that would seem to undermine or partially
frustrate the purposes of the certification by the Ninth Circuit.
Therefore, under the circumstances of this proceeding, we find
insufficient grounds for recusal of the [c]hief [j]ustice.").
Id
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The Ninth Circuit ordered certification.204 Six questions were
certified to the Supreme Court of Hawai'i as to the meaning and
effect of the McBryde decision.205
It would be Chief Justice Richardson who would write the
opinion answering the certified questions.206 In his answer,
Richardson was clear. Corporeal ownership of water was never a
Hawaiian concept.207 Thus, state ownership, as was awarded to the
State by the McBryde decision, merely meant that the State had a
public trust, "not ownership in a corporeal sense." 20 8
If the [Supreme Court of Hawai'i] . . . had merely
awarded the State a public trust over the waters and not
corporeal ownership, there was no taking, for nothing had
been given to the State of Hawai'i. [Furthermore, no
action had been taken to enforce McBryde Sugar Co. v.
Robinson.209 ] If nothing had been (judicially) taken, and
no action had been taken to enforce the McBryde
decision, then the complaint filed in the federal district
court had been premature. The case was not ripe-not
ready to be heard. The Supreme Court of the United
States now had a basis by which to rule and avoid the
difficult constitutional question of whether or not the
[Supreme Court of Hawai'i] had taken the plaintiffs'
property. A ruling based on ripeness would not . . .
forever foreclose the plaintiffs[] from seeking relief. The
sugar companies could file suit when [and if the State
204 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 131.
205 Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 292 (Haw. 1982).
206id
207 Id. at 306.
208 Id. at 310.
209 See Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 87 (stating that the
suit was to "enjoin undefined state action").
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moved to] stop[] the sugar companies from withdrawing
water.
The intuition that the [Supreme Court of the United
States] did not want to rule on the constitutional issue of a
judicial taking proved accurate. The [Supreme Court of
the United States] granted [the petition for] certiorari but
vacated the injunction against the [Supreme Court of
Hawai'i], remanding to the Ninth Circuit on the basis of a
lack of ripeness." 210
It was much better to vacate the lower court's judgment on the
grounds of a lack of ripeness than to risk all on the chance of the
Supreme Court finding that there was no such concept as a judicial
taking.211
However, the trial court judge that had originally found there
to be a judicial taking ignored the Supreme Court's order to
vacate. 2 12 Judge Pence gave two reasons for refusing to follow the
instructions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
First, Judge Pence asserted that the Solicitor General of the
United States, who had filed a critical brief urging dismissal on the
grounds of ripeness, had insufficient familiarity with Hawai'i.213
210 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 132-33
(footnotes omitted).
211 Id. at 133 & n.149 ("Thus, in 1986 the . . . Supreme Court [of the
United States] remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to examine whether Pence
had acted prematurely-whether the case was ripe. The Supreme Court
completely avoided the takings claim. The case was not ripe, for no action had
been taken on the ... Abe decision. No waters had yet been seized.").
212 See id. at 133.
213 Id. at 133 & n.150. That footnote states:
A review of the record and briefs filed with the Supreme Court shows
that less than one month from the time [t]he Court received the
Solicitor General's brief, and only 14 days before the end of its 1985
term, it issued the above remand.... Since, as indicated, this judge
has concluded that it was the brief of the Solicitor General and his
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Second, Judge Pence argued that the Court had insufficient time to
adequately consider the complexities of the case.214 Despite the
answers from the Supreme Court of Hawai'i as to the certified
questions, Judge Pence reaffirmed his decision of a judicial
taking. 2 15 He deemed those answers self-serving-written simply
to avoid constitutional challenge. 2 16 Throughout his opinion, Judge
Pence vehemently denounced the "Richardson [c]ourt." 2 17
uncritical assumption of "unripeness" of this case which triggered
[t]he Court's granting certiorari and remand, therefore, this judge in
this decision will primarily address the position taken by the Solicitor
General in his [a]micus [b]rief.
Id. at 133 n.150 (citing Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 676 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (D. Haw.
1987), vacated, 887 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1989)).
214 Robinson, 676 F. Supp. at 1004 ("This judge draws the conclusion that
[t]he Court, 'caught in the end of the term crunch,' and, having a high regard for
all briefs filed by the Solicitor General of the United States, simply followed the
Solicitor General's recommendation that 'the petition for a writ of certiorari
should be granted, the judgment of the court of appeals vacated, and the case
remanded to the court of appeals for further consideration in light of Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank [ofJohnson City, 473
U.S. 172 (1985)],' opting not to decide the case at that time, and thus
postponing, indefinitely, the time-consuming effort involved in the ultimate
disposition of the case." (footnotes omitted)).
215 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 134.
216 See Robinson, 676 F. Supp. at 1019.
217 See id. at 1017-20.
The Richardson [c]ourt's discussion of the takings issue sharply
illustrates the obfuscation and evasiveness of the [a]nswers of that
[c]ourt.
One can only conclude that the above statements were deliberately
and grossly misleading (and, if presented in the federal courts, would
mandate [sanctions under rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, FED. R. CIv. P. 11]). It was only in this federal court that
the plaintiffs had a full and uncircumscribed opportunity to raise the
constitutional questions.
When one reviews the 30-printed-page response of the Richardson
[c]ourt to the six questions, it becomes manifest that it was
endeavoring, by misdirection, misinformation, misapplication, and
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The Ninth Circuit reversed Judge Pence's refusal to follow the
instructions of the Supreme Court of the United States. 2 18 The
Ninth Circuit directed Judge Pence to dismiss the complaint based
on a lack of ripeness. 219
V. DID THE SUPREME COURT OF HAWAI'I IN McBRYDE SUGAR CO. V.
ROBINSON COMMIT A JUDICIAL TAKING IN LIGHT OF THE PLURALITY
OPINION IN STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT?
Would Robinson v. Ariyoshi be considered a judicial taking
today under the plurality's test as proposed in Stop the Beach
Renourishment?
misconstruction of facts and law to save its McBryde decisions and
avoid the constitutional consequences of its unprecedented radical
and violent change in the law on waters in the State of Hawaii.
Cutting like a strand of barbed wire in the fabric of the Richardson
[c]ourt's artfully manufactured [a]nswers is that [clourt's adamant
refusal to modify any rule set forth in McBryde.
Reppun clearly and finally implemented McBryde's destruction of the
value of the water rights owned by several of the small owners, as
well as G & R and McBryde, who had purchased the same from
owners of such appurtenant rights, when it held that "the riparian
water rights ... cannot be severed from the land in any fashion."
Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 134 (quoting Robinson,
676 F. Supp. at 1017-20) (footnotes omitted).
218 Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 887 F.2d 215, 219 (9th Cir. 1989); see also
Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 135.
219 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 135. It did not
stop with that opinion. Judge Pence also awarded 4 million dollars in attorneys'
fees to the sugar companies-including attorneys' fees for stifling this author's
judicial takings scholarship. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed Judge Pence's ruling
on attorneys' fees. Id.; see also Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 933 F.2d 781, 786 (9th
Cir. 1991) (reversing award of attorneys' fees).
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It has been more than twenty-five years since the Supreme
Court of the United States last ruled in Robinson v. Ariyoshi.220 In
those twenty-five years, the court has changed. Today, four
members of the Supreme Court believe that there is a judicial
takings claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.221 Two more members of the Court support limits on
state courts under the substantive Due Process Clause.222 Thus, a
majority of six would find some limit on how far state supreme
courts may go in overturning prior precedent upon which vested
rights are allegedly based.
The Court in Stop the Beach Renourishment fashioned a two-
part test. 223 First, was the right that was extinguished an
established right under state law? 224 Second, are there background
principles inherent in the property law of the state that would
dispel any claim of a judicial taking? 225
220 See Ariyoshi v. Robinson, 477 U.S. 902 (1986) (vacating and
remanding "to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for
further consideration").
221 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601-02 (plurality opinion).
222 Id. at 2613 (Kennedy J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
223 Id. 2608-09 (plurality opinion).
224 See id. at 2608.
If a legislature or a court declares that what was once an established
right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that property,
no less than if the State had physically appropriated or destroyed its
value by regulation. "[A] State by ipse dixit, may not transform
private property into public property without compensation."
Id. at 2602 (alteration in original) (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)).
225 Id. at 2608-09 (alteration in original) (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992)) ("For example, a regulation that deprives
a property owner of all economically beneficial use of his property is not a
taking if the restriction 'inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restriction that
background principles of the [s]tate's law of property and nuisance already place
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The answers to the certified questions in Robinson v. Ariyoshi
clearly demonstrate that both parts of the plurality's test would
have been met. First, the Supreme Court of Hawai'i specifically
stated that the law of surplus water rights was not settled.226
Second, the court examined the historical context in which surplus
water rights developed and found that the territorial courts which
developed the concept were not representative of the political will
of the people of Hawai'i. 227 Third, the Supreme Court of Hawai'i
relied on section 1-1 of the Hawai'i Revised Statutes,228 a statute
enacted in 1892 that states that Hawaiian custom, Hawaiian
judicial precedent, and Hawaiian usage are all exceptions to the
English common law.229 In essence, such custom, precedent, and
usage are part of the "background" of titles to land and water in
Hawai'i. 230 Fourth, and perhaps most important, the Supreme
Court of Hawai'i held that the public trust doctrine is a background
principle inherent in all land and water rights in Hawai'i.231
A. Surplus Water Rights Were Not Established Property Rights
The certified questions sent to the Supreme Court of Hawai'i
provided a basis by which it was able to articulate its view that
surplus water rights, the rights that the sugar companies claims
were allegedly vested, were not settled and established property
upon land ownership."'). Moreover, the Court did away with the
"unpredictability" test of Hughes v. Washington. Stop the Beach Renourishment,
130 S. Ct. at 2610 (plurality opinion). "The focus of petitioner's test is
misdirected. What counts is not whether there is precedent for the allegedly
confiscatory decision, but whether the property right allegedly taken was
established." Id.
226 Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 306 (Haw. 1982).
2 1 Id. at 306 n.25.
228 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-1 (LexisNexis 2009).
229 Robinson, 658 P.2d at 306.
230 See id. (stating that the cited statute had only been amended one time
since it was enacted in 1892).
231 Id. at 310.
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rights under Hawai'i law.232 As the court would state in its opinion
answering the certified questions:
A part of Hawai'i's case law, however, appears to have
departed from this model by treating "surplus water" as
the property of a private individual. We do not believe the
departure represented "settled" law. Instead, as the
following review of the relevant case law and its impact
demonstrates, Hawai'i's law regarding surplus water was
at the time of McBryde in such a state of flux and
confusion that it undoubtedly frustrated those who sought
to understand and apply it. The difficulty of insuring an
equitable distribution of unevenly flowing waters in the
face of competing claims and increasing demands made
the delineation and application of a simplistic doctrine of
ownership well nigh impossible. McBryde was brought to
us for decision in this context. 233
Surplus water rights, according to the Supreme Court of
Hawai'i, were always subject to other undefined rights:
Thus, in the one hundred and twenty five years between
the Mdhele and the McBryde opinion this court had issued
three separate opinions respecting surplus water, with
more than a decade between each. Each treated surplus
water differently and in none of them did the court even
attempt to clearly define or quantify the nature of this
right. Any reference to the problem was confined to the
232 See id. at 294 (certified question six asked: "Until McBryde . . . was
decided, had the issue of who owned surplus water been a settled question in
Hawaii law?").
233 Id at 306 (footnote omitted).
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discussion of the undelineated rights of others to a
watercourse. 234
The court went on to emphasize that surplus water rights were
not settled law:
We do not believe that the concept of surplus water had
ever been sufficiently delineated so that ownership of
such water could be considered settled to a point where
further development of the doctrine was precluded.235
The court proceeded to analyze the few territorial precedents
236
on surplus waters.26 It concluded by noting that even the sugar
companies, in their own briefs to the trial court and the supreme
court, had noted that the concept of surplus water was not a firmly
established principle: "Thus, even in the original McBryde action,
the parties implicitly conceded that, far from being settled, the law
governing surplus water was in a state of flux and confusion and
that the court had both the power and duty to reassess and resolve
the situation." 237
234 Id. at 308.
235 Robinson, 658 P.2d at 308-09.
236 Id. at 309.
237 Id. at 309-10.
Many of these problems [regarding uncertainty in the concept of
surplus water rights] were recognized in the arguments presented by
the parties before this court in the original McBryde action.
The positions urged by the private parties in the original appeal
ran the gamut of conceivable formulations. Gay & Robinson
characterized Carter [v. Territory, 24 Haw. 47 (1917)] as
engendering "[fifty-two] years of uncertainty[." . . .
McBryde . . . argued for the retention of Carter, not only as
existing law of the land but as consistent with the practices of the
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Accordingly, surplus water rights were not an established
property right.2 38
B. Historical Circumstance as a Background Principle
Moreover, the court held that McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson
can only be understood when viewed against the unique political
background of Hawai'i. 239 Hawai'i was a sovereign nation of its
own: the Kingdom of Hawai'i from 1840 to 1893.240 Hawai'i was
recognized as an equal sovereign by the United States.241 The
Kingdom of Hawai'i, a constitutional monarchy, had a developing
common law that recognized Hawaiian custom and usage.242
Water, under the laws of the Kingdom of Hawai'i, was not private
243 244
property. Water was a communal resource.
ahupuaa from time immemorial. However, it argued in the alternative
that:
"If this court determines that the rule of Carter v.
Territory as to surplus storm and freshet flow should no longer
be the law of Hawaii, then [the court should adopt] . . . some
other just rule."
Id. at 309.
238 See id. at 310 (stating that a public trust was imposed on the water).
239 See id at 306 (discussing the confusion around the law of surplus water
rights to be determined in McBryde).
240 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 116.
241 Michael M. McPherson & Stephanie M. Parent, Native Hawaiians, 21
ENVTL. L. 1301, 1314 n.71 (1991).
242 D. Kapua Sproat, The Backlash Against PASH. Legislative Attempts to
Restrict Native Hawaiian Rights, 20 U. HAW. L. REv. 321, 323 (1998).
243 See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 306 (Haw. 1982) ("Prior to
1848 land and its usufructs within the [K]ingdom of Hawaii were the property of
the king."). But to say that water, a usufruct, was the "property" of the king was
in effect to establish that water was a communal resource owned in part by the
people. See Kathryn Nalani Setsuko Hong, Understanding Native Hawaiian
Rights: Mistakes and Consequences of Rice v. Cayetano, 15 ASIAN AM. L.J. 9,
12 (2008). Private ownership of lands was not introduced until 1848. Id.
244 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 138.
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The Kingdom of Hawai'i was overthrown in 1893.245 The
overthrow was designed not only to seize political control of
government, but also to capture the Supreme Court of Hawai'i.246
The rebels, largely American businessmen with strong ties to the
growing and dominant sugar industry, needed the supreme
court.247
Laws that favored the communal sharing of water in riparian
fashion, essential for native taro cultivation, needed to be changed
to benefit sugar.248 In order for the sugar industry to thrive, water
had to be transferred from one watershed to another.249 Hence,
water could not be a communal entity; it had to be privately
owned. In 1893, the new Supreme Court of Hawai'i, now under
rebel control, had no qualms about privatizing water.250
245 Jon M. Van Dyke, The Political Status of the Native Hawaiian People,
17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 95, 102 (1998).
246 See generally Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at
118 (discussing the changes during the "post-overthrow period" and explaining
that the elite and powerful, particularly the sugar industry, captured the supreme
court).
247 See generally id at 105 (discussing the influence of the sugar industry
on the supreme court and its justices in controlling Hawai'i's social and
economic structure).
248 See generally id. at 113 (explaining that the privatization of water for
sugar was detrimental for taro cultivation). Taro was grown on the windward
side of the Hawaiian Islands. Sugar grew best on the hot, dry leeward sides of
the islands. See Christine Daleiden, Hawaii's Ditch System: Water Allocation
After the Sugar Cane, 10-JUL HAW. B.J. 28, 4-5 (2006). Sugar needs great
amounts of water. See id. 3 & n.3. Water had to be privatized so as to transfer
water from the wet windward sides of the islands to the hot, dry leeward side
where sugar grew best. See id. T T4-5.
249 See generally Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at
118 (discussing that the change in water rights influenced by the dominant sugar
industry differed greatly from the customary Hawaiian practice of communal
water ownership).
250 See Peck v. Bailey, 8 Haw. 658, 671 (1867) (decision of a single justice
of the Supreme Court of Hawai'i). Peck was significant in that it was the first
decision to allow the use of surface water for sugar. Thus, its publication in
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Thus, in a series of decisions from 1895 to 1917, the concept
of surplus water was used to capture, as private property, large
251
amounts of water that were formerly communal and riparian.
In place of the monarchy, a provisional government ruled
from 1893 to 1894.252 In 1894, the Republic of Hawai'i was
established as the successor to the provisional government.253 In
1898, the United States, without conducting a plebiscite among the
people of Hawai'i, annexed the Hawaiian Islands.254 Annexation
was achieved by the unilateral act of the United States-by a joint
resolution, not by a treaty.255
From the period beginning in 1893 and lasting until statehood
in 1959, the Supreme Court of Hawai'i and the decisions rendered
by that court were dominated by the needs of the large sugar
interests known as the "Big Five." 256 Consistently, justices of the
Territorial Supreme Court of Hawai'i were appointed from the very
1893, after the overthrow, was timed to influence cases that involved conflicts
between sugar and taro uses.
251 See Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Co. v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 15 Haw.
675 (1904); Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Co. v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 14 Haw.
50 (1902); Lonoaea v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 9 Haw. 651 (1895); Carter v.
Territory, 24 Haw. 47 (1917).
252 Robert J. Morris, Configuring the Bo(u)nds of Marriage: The
Implications of Hawaiian Culture & Values for the Debate About Monogamy, 8
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 105, 113 (1996).
253 id
254 See Van Dyke, supra note 245, at 103-04 & n.49; see also Jennifer M.L.
Chock, One Hundred Years of Illegitimacy: International Legal Analysis of the
Illegal Overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy, Hawai'i's Annexation, and
Possible Reparations, 17 U. HAW. L. REv. 463, 490-93 (1995) (explaining that a
majority of the Hawaiian people did not approve of the annexation).
255 Chock, supra note 254, at 490.
256 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 105. The Big
Five were the five largest sugar merchants in Hawai'i. Big Five-Hawaii
History-Short Stories, HAWAIIHISTORY.ORG,
http://www.hawaiihistory.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ig.page&PagelD=29 (last
visited Mar. 24, 2012).
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law firms that represented the large sugar interests. 257
Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court of Hawai'i during the territorial
period reaffirmed the concept of surplus water rights. 258
This pattern did not change during Hawai'i's territorial period
from 1898 to 1959.259 The justices of the Supreme Court of
Hawai'i during the territorial period were selected by the President
of the United States. 260 The people of Hawai'i could not vote for
the President, 26 1 nor was the governor of the territory elected by
the people.2 62 The justices of the Supreme Court of Hawai'i during
the territorial period were selected by the President based on
257 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 105-06.
258 Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 306-07 & n.25 (Haw. 1982)
(explaining that the supreme court during the territorial period used the concept
of surplus water rights). As the Supreme Court of Hawai'i, through Chief Justice
Richardson, stated in Reppun:
[O]ur decision [in the earlier 1973 opinion of McBryde v. Robinson]
was premised on the firm conviction that prior [territorial] courts had
largely ignored the mandates of the rulers of the [k]ingdom and the
traditions of the native Hawaiians in their zeal to convert these islands
into a manageable society.
We cannot continue to ignore what we firmly believe were
fundamental mistakes regarding one of the most precious of our
resources. McBryde was a necessary and proper step in the
rectification of basic misconceptions concerning water "rights" in
Hawaii.
Reppun v. Bd. of Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57, 67-69 (Haw. 1982).
259 See Elizabeth Ann Ho-oipo Kala'ena'auao Pa Martin et al., Cultures in
Conflict in Hawai'i: The Law and Politics of Native Hawaiian Water Rights, 18
U. HAW. L. REv. 71, 97 (1996) (discussing reversal of private water ownership
in 1959).
260 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 105.
261 id
262 Id. at 107 n.36; see also Chang, Missing the Boat, supra note 8, at 165.
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263
recommendations of the Secretary of the Interior. These justices
were inevitably selected from the large law firms that supported
the sugar interests.264
The chief justice, in his own words, explained the imposition
of Western practices on Hawaiian law:
Hawai'i has a unique legal system, a system of laws that
was originally built on an ancient and traditional culture.
While that ancient culture had largely been displaced,
nevertheless many of the underlying guiding principles
remained. During the years after the illegal overthrow of
the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893 and through Hawai'i's
territorial period, the decisions of our highest court
reflected a primarily Western orientation and sensibility
that wasn't a comfortable fit with Hawai'i's indigenous
people and its immigrant population. We set about
returning control of interpreting the law to those with
deep roots in and profound love for Hawai'i. The result
can be found in the decisions of our [s]upreme [c]ourt
beginning after [s]tatehood. Thus, we made a conscious
effort to look to Hawaiian custom and tradition in
deciding our cases-and consistent with Hawaiian
practice, our court held that the beaches were free to all,
that access to the mountains and shoreline must be
provided to the people, and that water resources could not
be privately owned.265
263 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 105-06
(explaining that Justice Richardson recalled in an interview that the Secretary of
the Interior had a hand in appointing the justices).
264 Id. at 105.
265 MacKenzie, supra note 22, at 6-7 (quoting William S. Richardson,
Spirit of Excellence Award Acceptance Speech at the ABA Spirit of Excellence
Awards Luncheon (Feb. 10, 2007)).
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Territorial law had supplanted the principles and practices of
the Kingdom of Hawai'i with Western property law. 266
To Chief Justice Richardson, the precedent and
jurisprudence of the territorial period was not
'Hawaiian'-not 'pono['-that is, "harmonious" or
"righteous."] . . . The [c]hief [j]ustice saw his duty as
returning the law to those with 'deep roots' in and a
'profound love' of [Hawai'i]. Territorial precedent could
be set aside.267
McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson was thus a corrective
decision. It restored communal water practices in place of private
ownership of water. 268
Chief Justice Richardson was the second chief justice to serve
after statehood. 269 He was the longest-serving chief justice after
statehood.270 He was a product of the political change that came
with statehood.271 With statehood, the governor was elected by the
266 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 118.
267 Id. at 118-19; see Pai 'Ohana v. United States, 76 F.3d 280, 282 (9th
Cir. 1996) (citations omitted) (citing Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawai'i
Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1269 (Haw. 1995)) ("[C]ommon law
rights ordinarily associated with tenancy do not limit customary rights existing
under the laws of [Hawai'i]. In so holding, the [Supreme Court of Hawai'i]
reiterated the fact, well-established in Hawaiian property law, that 'customary
and traditional rights ... flow from native Hawaiians' pre-existing sovereignty,'
and were not extinguished by Hawaii's entry into the United States.").
268 See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1338 (Haw.
1973).
269 See generally MacKenzie, supra note 22 (explaining that he was
appointed in 1966, which was seven years after statehood).
270 See generally id. (recognizing that he served on the Supreme Court of
Hawai'i for sixteen years after being appointed in 1966).
271 See generally Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at
107 & n.36 (discussing the jurisprudential change that corresponded with
Hawaiian political change).
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people by popular vote. 272 The governor chose the justices of the
Supreme Court of Hawai'i.273 Thus, those justices reflected the
broad coalition that had elected Governor Bums-Japanese
Americans, Chinese Americans, Filipinos, and others who made up
the Democratic Party.274 Clearly, the Supreme Court of Hawai'i
after statehood would be a different kind of court.275
The governor, elected by the new middle class, selected those
who were outsiders during the period of provisional government,
republic, and territory.276 A new judiciary meant a new
jurisprudence. 277
In this fashion, the decision to approve statehood for Hawai'i,
with the concomitant result of an elected governor and a new kind
of supreme court, constituted a political mandate for a new
Hawaiian jurisprudence.278 Support for statehood, both in
Washington and in Hawai'i, was support for fundamental changes
in Hawaii-and one such change was the composition of the
court.279 With a new composition, the Supreme Court of Hawai'i
could not, and did not, simply reaffirm property and tort rules that
had disadvantaged the average person.280
272 Id. at 106.
273 id
274 d
275 See id.; see also DODD, supra note 20, at 54, 80 n.37 (describing the
composition of the court before and after statehood).
276 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 111-12
(quoting Williamson B.C. Chang, Law and the Reconstruction of Communal
Property Values 1-3 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)).
277 Id. at 106.
27 8 Id. at 107.
279 Id.
280 See DODD, supra note 20, at 54 (showing the Richardson court's shift
from traditional Anglo-American law).
Thus, there should have been little surprise that the Richardson
[c]ourt, now constituted by persons selected by the new, popularly
elected governor, would challenge the jurisprudence set down by the
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"The decisions of the Richardson [c]ourt were not sudden and
radical departures from settled law." 2 8 1 It is fair to assert that
"[c]hanges in the governance of Hawai'i, as well as changes in the
manner in which law was interpreted," had to be foreseen and
wholly expected "by both those in Washington as well as in
Hawai'i." 28 2
C. Section 1-1 of the Hawai'i Revised Statutes Justifies
McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson
Section 1-1 of the Hawai'i Revised Statutes is "the statutory
tool by which the" Supreme Court of Hawai'i can correct erroneous
intervening law by resurrecting past precedents, custom, and
usage.283
Territorial Supreme Court [of Hawai'i]. It would be unrealistic to
expect that the new court, made of persons from different classes and
different backgrounds than past courts, would simply rubber-stamp
the jurisprudence of the past.
Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 106.
281 Id. at 107.
282 id
To have expected the judicial decisions of the [Supreme Court of
Hawai'i] to simply reaffirm earlier precedents of another political era
would have been unrealistic. It would be similar to expecting the first
. . . Supreme Court [of the United States] to blindly follow the
precedents of the English law, or to expect that a new Supreme Court
appointed in the aftermath of the election of President Aquino of the
Phillipines, would be required by the rules of stare decisis to uphold
all the precedents of the prior Court, appointed by former President
Marcos.
Chang, Missing the Boat, supra note 8, at 166.
283 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 119-20.
For Chief Justice Richardson, . . . section 1-1 was the most important
of Hawai'i's laws. On many occasions he would emphasize to his law
clerks the central importance of section 1-1. For example, Justice
Robert Klein recalled, as a law clerk for Chief Justice Richardson,
being taught and reminded by the [c]hief [j]ustice of section 1-1. It
was the vehicle that connected jurisprudence of the State of Hawai'i
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It was designed, as of 1892, to incorporate the common
law of England and the United States as the law of the
Kingdom of Hawai'i. It had important exceptions:
common law was displaced if there was conflicting
Hawaiian precedent, custom or usage. The original
section 1-1, the Judiciary Act of 1892, was reenacted by
the [t]erritory and by the [s]tate. Today, it reads as
follows:
The common law of England, as ascertained by
English and American decisions, is declared to be
the common law of the State of Hawaii in all cases,
except as otherwise expressly provided by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or by the
laws of the [s]tate, or fixed by Hawaiian judicial
precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage,
provided that no person shall be subject to criminal
proceedings except as provided by the written laws
of the United States or the [s]tate.
For the [c]hief [j]ustice, section 1-1, or the principle of
'looking back' to the laws and values of the [k]ingdom,
was present in all of his critical property decisions:
Palama v. Sheehan, In re Ashford, County of Hawaii v.
Sotomura, In re Sanborn, Reppun v. Board of Water
with the laws, values and customs of the Kingdom of Hawai'i. Justice
Klein would use section 1-1 in the landmark PASH decision by which
he, for the court, incorporated section 7-1, as applicable to modem
property rights.
Id. at 119 n.78; see also Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawai'i Cnty.
Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1258 (Haw. 1995) (showing how Justice
Klein applied section 1-1 and 7-1 to modem property rights).
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Supply, Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., and ... Robinson v.
Ariyoshi.284
The chief justice would use section 1-1 to correct the law,
disregarding decisions that arose from the periods in which the
Hawai'i judiciary was the product of a disenfranchised public.285
Thus, in footnote twenty-five of Robinson v. Ariyoshi, the chief
justice distinguishes the territorial period as a regime in which the
people of Hawai'i were essentially non-self-governing:
We recognize that HRS [section] 1-1, which was
enacted during the monarchy in 1892 and amended only
once, in 1903, might be construed to adopt territorial
caselaw as among the "Hawaiian judicial precedent"
representing the common law of the [s]tate. We do not at
this time, however, address the question of whether those
cases can truly be considered "Hawaiian" rather than
federal precedent for we wish only to point out that the
development of the law governing surplus water took
place during a period when the resources of our land were
subject to an authority which did not directly represent
Hawaii's people and that the most recent pronouncements
284 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 119-20
(footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745 (Haw.
1982); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287 (Haw. 1982); Reppun v. Bd. of
Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57 (Haw. 1982); United Congregational & Evangelical
Churches of Mo Ku'aikaua & Helani v. Kamamalu, 582 P.2d 208 (Haw. 1978);
In re Sanborn, 562 P.2d 771 (Haw. 1977); County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517
P.2d 57 (Haw. 1973); McBryde Sugar Co. v Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330 (Haw.
1973), affd on reh'g, 517 P.2d 26 (1973) (per curium); In re Kelley, 445 P.2d
538 (Haw. 1968); In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968); In re Robinson, 421
P.2d 570 (Haw. 1966).
285 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 137-38.
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on the subject arise more immediately from the authority
of those who will be forever affected by it.2 86
Nonetheless, this view of section 1-1 as expressed in footnote
twenty-five was extremely controversial. 287 "The jurisprudence by
which the [c]hief [j]ustice looked past territorial precedent to
resurrect the values and principles of the [k]ingdom [was] sternly
challenged." 288 Critics, such as Judge Pence, "sharply denounced
the logic of footnote [twenty-five],"289 which implied that
territorial precedents of the Supreme Court of Hawai'i were not
entitled to the same precedential value as decisions rendered
during statehood or the period of the Kingdom of Hawai'i:
In the quotation from Robinson II, supra, is to be
found note [twenty-five]. That note typifies the frantic
search on the part of the Richardson [c]ourt to justify its
sudden reversal of settled law. Because the rights of the
konohiki as to surplus water were first decided during the
[m]onarchy and the [r]epublic, and after 1897 by judges
and justices of the Territorial Supreme Court [of Hawai'i]
appointed by the President of the United States, therefore,
said the [a]nswers, all those opinions "were not the
product of local judiciary[.]" . . . Pure chauvinistic
sophistry! The Richardson [c]ourt would hold for naught
the Constitution of the State of Hawaii, [a]rticle XVIII,
[s]ection 9-"Continuity of Laws:" " . . all
28 6 Id. at 117; Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 306 n.25 (Haw. 1982).





existing . .. judgment . . . titles and rights shall continue
unaffected .... " 290
Ultimately, after some thirty years, that jurisprudence
29129
succeeded. It has become accepted in Hawai'i.292
First, it would restore to Hawaiians a sense of
sovereignty. Second, it would unify both Hawaiians and
the immigrant communities that had come to work the
plantations. Third, it would be a jurisprudence appropriate
for an island-based society. Fourth, and perhaps most
important, that jurisprudence would withstand
constitutional attack [as a judicial taking].293
D. The Public Trust Doctrine Constitutes a Legitimate
Background Principle
The Supreme Court of Hawai'i declared that state ownership
of waters, as used in the first McBryde opinion, was a restatement
of the public trust over Hawai'i's waters:
The McBryde opinion, however, did not supplant the
konohikis with the State as the owner of surplus waters in
the sense that the State is now free to do as it pleases with
the waters of our lands. In McBryde, . . . we indeed held
that at the time of the introduction of fee simple
ownership to these islands the king reserved the
ownership of all surface waters. But we believe that by
this reservation, a public trust was imposed upon all
290 Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 676 F. Supp. 1002, 1019 n.35 (D. Haw. 1987),
vacated, 887 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1989); see also RAW. CONST. art. XVIII, § 9;
Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 114 n.57.





waters of the kingdom. That is, we find the public interest
in the waters of the kingdom was understood to
necessitate a retention of authority and the imposition of a
concomitant duty to maintain the purity and flow of our
waters for future generations and to assure that the waters
of our land are put to reasonable and beneficial uses. This
is not ownership in the corporeal sense where the State
may do with the property as it pleases; rather, we
comprehend the nature of the State's ownership as a
retention of such authority to assure the continued
existence and beneficial application of the resource for the
common good.294
Thus, this imposition of a public trust over Hawai'i's waters
was critical to the court's finding that surplus water rights were
inconsistent with the public trust doctrine. 2 95 In finding that the
State had a public trust, and not merely a police power, over the
waters, the court noted that the trust enabled the State to
"necessarily limit[] the creation of certain private interests in [the]
waters." 296
Under the plurality's two-tiered test in Stop the Beach
Renourishment, the public trust doctrine is a background principle
that serves to undermine assertions of a judicial taking and is a
294 Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310 (Haw. 1982) (citation
omitted).
295 See id. at 311.
296 Id. at 310 n.31 ("The state unquestionably has the power to accomplish
much of this through its police powers. We believe however, that the [k]ing's
reservation of his sovereign prerogatives respecting water constituted much
more than a restatement of police powers[;] rather[,] we find that it retained on
behalf of the people an interest in the waters of the kingdom which the State has
an obligation to enforce and which necessarily limited the creation of certain
private interests in the waters." (citation omitted)).
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defense to an alleged judicial taking. 29 7 The public trust doctrine
was the background principle used by the Supreme Court of
California in the "Mono Lake" Case, National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court,298 a case which otherwise would have been
challenged as a judicial taking.
McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson survives the plurality's test in
Stop the Beach Renourishment for a judicial taking. First, surplus
water rights were never an established right. 299 Second, Hawai'i is
unique both politically and legally. 300 Territorial precedents,
decisions that established surplus water rights, were not
representative of the political will of the majority of the people. 30 1
As such, these decisions were subject to correction during
statehood. Third, section 1-1 of the Hawai'i Revised Statutes
empowers the Supreme Court of Hawai'i to resurrect Hawaiian
judicial precedent, custom, and usage from the period of the
Kingdom of Hawai'i.302 Fourth, the public trust doctrine is a
background principle that inheres in water titles. 303
VI. CONCLUSION
Finally, what can we learn from the Hawai'i experience in
light of Robinson v. Ariyoshi?
297 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597-98, 2611 (2010).
298 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709,
712 (Cal. 1983) (en banc).299 See discussion supra Part V.A.
300 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 115
("Hawai'i has a unique legal system, a system of laws that was originally built
on an ancient and traditional culture.")
301 See id. at 114 ("[T]erritorial precedent was not really 'Hawaiian'
precedent for the purposes of the law. Hawai'i, during the territorial period, had
been captured by the federal government.").
302 See discussion supra Part V.C.
303 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 130-31.
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First and foremost, the fear of chaos arising from the
application of the judicial takings doctrine is a real fear. In
Robinson, one can see that the use of the doctrine of judicial
takings can run amok, creating nearly unbearable tensions between
the state supreme courts and the lower federal courts.304 The
collateral attack in the Robinson litigation was lengthy305 and
costly, 306 and it produced nothing in terms of real results. 30 7
During the trial and its appeals, state and federal relations were
strained, and great uncertainty prevailed as to the state of the
law.308 Moreover, the business of allocating water was
paralyzed.309
Second, despite what the plurality in Stop the Beach
Renourishment says about the application of the Rooker
doctrine, 310 that doctrine is not an effective brake on the ability of
304 See procedural discussion supra Part IV.
305 The federal litigation began in 1975 and ended in 1991. See Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Haw. 1977), affd in part, vacated in part, 753
F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 902 (1986); Robinson v. Ariyoshi,
933 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1991).
306 Fees that were awarded to the plaintiff under title 42, section 1983 of
the United States Code and later rescinded were in the amount of 4 million
dollars. Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 135; see also
Robinson, 933 F.2d at 786 (reversing the award of attorneys' fees).
307 See Martin et al., supra note 259, at 102 (explaining that the collateral
attack lasted 15 years, but the State never actually deprived the sugar companies
of their water rights, so the issue was not ripe for decision by the Supreme Court
of the United States); see also Chang, Missing the Boat, supra note 8, at 151
("In a very real sense Robinson is much ado about nothing.").
308 See discussion supra Part IV (detailing the tension between the courts
and parties).
309 See Martin et al., supra note 259, at 105-06 (stating that large water
consumers had to resort to the political process for allocation of water).
310 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2609 (2010) (plurality opinion) ("The finality principle that we
regularly apply to takings claims would require the claimant to appeal a claimed
taking by a lower court to the state supreme court, whence certiorari would
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federal district courts to collaterally attack the judgments of state
courts that are perceived to have committed a judicial taking. 3 11
Robinson shows that the Rooker doctrine is not applicable where
there are procedural due process claims arising alongside the
judicial takings claims.312 As long as a party can claim that it has
not been heard on the constitutional question of a judicial taking,
the Rooker doctrine is not applicable. 3 13
Third, the animosity that surrounded the Robinson litigation
demonstrates that the judicial takings doctrine fosters an
unwarranted suspicion that state courts are bent on destroying
property rights. 314 That is a suspicion that is no more applicable to
state courts than it is to federal courts. 3 15 If state supreme courts
come to this Court. If certiorari were denied, the claimant would no more be
able to launch a lower-court federal suit against the taking effected by the state
supreme-court opinion than he would be able to launch such a suit against a
legislative or executive taking approved by the state supreme-court opinion; the
matter would be res judicata.").
311 Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated,
477 U.S. 902 (1986). In Robinson, the losing parties in McBryde were able to
pursue a collateral attack despite the Rooker doctrine because they were alleging
procedural due process violations as well. See Chang, Unraveling Robinson,
supra note 8, at 82-83. Thus, they did not have a full and fair opportunity to
litigate their constitutional claims before the allegedly offending state supreme
court. See Robinson, 753 F.2d at 1472-73. As such, the Rooker doctrine was not
applied in Robinson. Id. Rooker would thus not protect state sovereignty in the
typical judicial takings claim-where the claim arises from the action of a state
supreme court. See id at 1472 ("Otherwise, if Rooker were a blanket
jurisdictional bar precluding the litigation of claims even if there had been no
actual state court opportunity to litigate them, Rooker would swallow the 'full
and fair opportunity to litigate' limitation to res judicata clearly established
elsewhere by the Supreme Court.").
312 Barros, supra note 9, at 950.
313 See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d at 1471-72.
314 See dicussion supra Parts II, III.
315 See Stacey L. Dogan & Ernest A. Young, Judicial Takings and
Collateral Attack on State Court Property Decisions, 6 DuKE J. CONST. L. &
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can take property under the plurality's test, then so can the federal
courts and the Supreme Court of the United States.3 16 The only
real bulwark against judicial takings for state supreme courts,
federal courts, and the Supreme Court of the United States is self-
regulation. 3 17
Fourth, if possible, judicial takings claims should be viewed
primarily as procedural due process violations. 3 18 It is often the
case that the judicial takings claim which surfaces first in a state
supreme court will arise alongside a procedural due process
claim.319 When a state supreme court ruling surprises a party with
an unexpected or unpredictable result, it is usually the case that the
parties have not had an opportunity to argue the takings claim
320before such an argument can be made in a petition for certiorari.
PUB. POL'Y 107, 108 (2011) (discussing how any judicial decision implementing
change could be considered a taking, whether by a state or federal court).
316 The Supreme Court of the United States, in retroactively overturning
prior decisions, can be accused of taking property as well. See, e.g., Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906-67 (2007);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003); United States v. Hatter, 532
U.S. 557, 566-67 (2001); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21-22 (1997);
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484-85
(1989); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S.
363, 382 (1977); see also David L. Siegel, Stop the Beach Renourishment:
Essay Reflections from Amici Curiae: Why We Will Probably Never See a
Judicial Takings Doctrine, 35 VT. L. REV. 459, 469-70 (2010).
317 Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 75-76 (discussing how
courts were historically viewed differently from the legislative and executive
branches as self-regulating). The Tenth Amendment accords to the states certain
realms separate and insulated from federal intervention. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
318 See Barros, supra note 9, at 936-40 (discussing the substantive due
process approach to takings by Justice Kennedy in Stop the Beach
Renourishment).
319 See, e.g., Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 293 & n.7 (Haw. 1982)
(providing an example of a judicial takings case being heard by the Supreme
Court of Hawai'i in which procedural due process violations were also alleged).
320 See, e.g., Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 125-
27 (showing an example of a time when the involved parties are surprised by a
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In such a case, it is the Supreme Court of the United States that
must first consider the validity of the argument as to the judicial
taking-that is, whether the alleged right taken was established.3 21
This was the situation in Stop the Beach Renourishment.
However, it should not be the Supreme Court of the United States
that must first sort out whether state law was settled, whether
background principles exist, and whether property rights were
established. 322 Those are questions of state law-questions that
state supreme courts can best answer. 32 3 The remedy is for the
Supreme Court of the United States to remand or certify questions
to the allegedly offending state supreme court, as was done in
Robinson, to clarify whether its judgment amounts to a judicial
taking.324
court's ruling and have not yet had the opportunity to argue a takings claim
before petitioning for certiorari).
321 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592, 2600-01 n.4 (2010) ("We ordinarily do not consider an issue first
presented to a state court in a petition for rehearing if the state court did not
address it. But where the state court decision itself is claimed to constitute a
violation of federal law, the state court's refusal to address that claim put
forward in a petition for rehearing will not bar our review." (citations omitted))
(citing Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83, 89 n.3 (1997) (per curium);
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 677-78 (1930)).
322 See Barros, supra note 9, at 933-34; see generally Stop the Beach
Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. 2592.
323 Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 104 ("It is
settled law in the United States that the various states are sovereign as to the law
of property. Thus, each state supreme court is the final arbiter with regard to the
property law of that state." (footnotes omitted)).
324 See, e.g., Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 292 (Haw. 1982)
(showing an example of a state supreme court answering certified questions
from a federal court). Given the extraordinary costs to federalism that abound if
the Supreme Court of the United States were to enjoin a state supreme court
opinion on the grounds of a judicial taking, the Supreme Court should, in
adopting a policy of initial respect for state supreme courts, give that state
supreme court every opportunity to be the first to clarify its allegedly
confiscatory holdings. See, e.g., id (showing an example of a federal court
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It is the state supreme court that knows its property law
best.325 It is the state supreme court that should be ruling on
questions of state property law, as was done in the answers to the
certified questions in Robinson.326 The Supreme Court of the
United States is not the best institution to do the "heavy lifting"-
the careful sorting out of state property law to determine if rights
were absolutely established.3 27 It is the state supreme courts that
should perform this task. Certification, as was done in Robinson,
should be the Supreme Court's first step in any petition for
certiorari that alleges a judicial taking.328
allowing the state supreme court to clarify state law by answering certified
questions); see also Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 59, 73-74.
325 See Chang, Perpetuated in Righteousness, supra note 14, at 104; see
also Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 96 (explaining that state
courts have sovereignty over state law).
326 See Robinson, 658 P.2d at 292. The fear here is that the state courts will
change their rulings so as to diminish or avoid the takings claim-avoiding the
implications of confiscation. This is the suspicion as to the answers to the
certified questions in McBryde. Id. It is true that the decision in McBryde was
modified in certain key respects-the prohibition against the transfer of waters
out of the watershed was eliminated-undermining one of the two main
complaints of the sugar company. Id. at 295. Yet, what is wrong with a state
supreme court, in a subsequent opinion, or open certification, modifying and
adjusting its earlier holding? Parties are often required to return to their state
supreme courts for clarification of the meaning of decisions that effect
fundamental changes. Id. at 292-94. Courts often modify their earlier landmark
opinions in later opinions that reflect on the wisdom of earlier holdings. Id.
(showing the Supreme Court of Hawaii's modification of its earlier opinion in
Robinson).
327 See Barros, supra note 9, at 932.
328 See Robinson, 658 P.2d at 292 (showing that questions were remanded
for certification to the Supreme Court of Hawai'i). Stop the Beach
Renourishment shows the folly of imposing upon the Supreme Court of the
United States the responsibility and task of ferreting out the meaning of state
law. What did the Sand Key decision hold? See generally Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2596 (2010)
(showing the difficulty for the Supreme Court of the United States to interpret
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Fifth, what one learns from both Robinson and Stop the Beach
Renourishment is that a "judicial takings" doctrine will always
exist, even if there are only four votes for such a claim.329 Namely,
even if it never materializes, the myth of a judicial taking still has
substantial power. The pull of the takings claim is far too strong
for it to ever fully disappear. 330
This author does not believe there should be a judicial takings
doctrine; it is incoherent and impossible to administer, 331 raises
stubborn problems of procedure, 332  and undermines the
sovereignty of state supreme courts.333 Nonetheless, the fear of a
judicial taking will also be present, meaning in effect that judicial
state law without an adequate record); Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement
Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assoc., 512 So. 2d 934, 941 (Fla. 1987). This is the job
and the province of state courts. See Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8,
at 96 (explaining that state courts have sovereignty over state law). The Supreme
Court of the United States is used to ruling on cases in which there is an
adequate and complete record before them. Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83,
90-91 (1997) (per curiam). In Stop the Beach Renourishment, there was no
adequate record arising from the state proceeding as to the meaning of Florida
state law. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2600-01 n.4 (citing
Adams, 520 U.S. at 89 n.3) ("We ordinarily do not consider an issue first
presented to a state court in a petition for rehearing if the state court did not
address it.").
329 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2597; McBryde Sugar Co.
v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1339 (Haw. 1973). McBryde and Stop the Beach
Renourishment each show instances of judicial takings. See Bradford H. Lamb,
Robinson v. Ariyoshi: A Federal Intrusion upon State Water Law, 17 ENVTL. L.
325, 350 (1987); see also Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2597. In
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Scalia's opinion on the conditions for
establishing a judicial taking garnered four votes. See Stop the Beach
Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2597. Scalia was joined only by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito. Id.
330 Ilya Shapiro & Trevor Burrus, Judicial Takings and Scalia's Shifiing
Sands, 35 VERMONT L. REv. 423, 435 (2010).
33 See Siegel, supra note 316, at 467.
332 Id. at 471-72.
3 Id. at 461-465.
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takings will always be around-and that may have positive
benefits in actuality. 334
The judicial takings doctrine is like a weapon; in terms of the
judiciary, imagine it to be a kind of atomic weapon-it should
never be used, but the very contemplation of such a weapon, even
if only in the mind, is both a deterrent and a force that compels
greater transparency.335 Thus, the Supreme Court of the United
States need do nothing more after Stop the Beach Renourishment,
336for the strong intuitive appeal of a judicial takings doctrine,
whether or not it actually exists,33 7 is a brake on state supreme
courts that may go too far. If they go too far, they must be ready to
justify their decisions by demonstrating that the vested rights
allegedly taken were not established and that there are background
principles which justify the progressive evolution of state law.
334 Id. at 472-74.
3 In Robinson, the threat of a judicial takings claim compelled the Ninth
Circuit to certify questions to the Supreme Court of Hawai'i. See Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 292 (Haw. 1982). In answering those questions, the
supreme court had to reassess its earlier decision in McBryde v. Robinson. Id. at
292, 294. Answering the certified questions compelled the Supreme Court of
Hawai'i to be more explicit and more specific as to what it had done. See id. at
292 (showing the court's further attention to each certified question on remand).
336 See supra notes 143-48, 150 and accompanying text discussing the
'layman's view' of a taking."
3 See supra note 175 and accompanying text; see also Siegel, supra note
316, at 459 (discussing the idea that the concept of judicial takings may or may
not actually exist and stating that the Supreme Court of the United States is
unlikely to adopt a judicial takings doctrine).
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